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Biometrics plays a vital role in identity management. Biometric data are, 
however, sensitive and vulnerable, and there is a need to develop biometric 
applications as a privacy-enhancing technology (PET) rather than a privacy-
invasive technology (PIT). Building on earlier FIDIS research, this report 
studies technical, organizational, and policy decisions in the development of 
biometrics applications that influence their becoming PETs or PITs. These 
decisions balance the interests of individuals to have control over their pers-
onal data against commercial, societal, and political interests, security, con-
venience, and efficiency. This report identifies criteria for determining the 
‘PET’ content of technologies and looks at several case studies of decision-
making processes in biometrics: biometric pseudonyms and iris recognition, 
Privacy Impact Assessments, voice recognition, the German ePass, and the 
Dutch central database of passport biometrics. These case studies suggest a 
possible gap between expectations and assessments based on technical 
knowledge and between economic and political expectations of and require-
ments for biometric applications. Based on this finding, recommendations 
are given to enhance awareness of privacy-enhancing technologies and to 
apply value-sensitive design in the development of biometric applications. 
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More and more applications rely on biometrics to authenticate or identify physical persons. 
Biometric data are intrinsically sensitive and vulnerable. If raw biometric data are misplaced, 
shared with parties that the owner does not approve of, or straightforwardly stolen, their 
owners have no choice but to have their biometrics removed from the system to avoid future 
fraudulent use. They have lost all advantages linked to this biometric in terms of convenience 
and security and this can not be repaired. Also with more sophisticated forms of biometric 
templates, revocability remains a major issue. 
The use of biometrics in identity-management processes has been extensively studied in 
research of the FIDIS consortium and many others. Another line of research within FIDIS, as 
well as by many other groups, has been the study of privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs). 
This deliverable aims to build on both strands of earlier research, in order to study the precise 
‘PET content’ of biometric applications currently in use or under development. PET in this 
context refers to a technology that protects personal privacy by minimizing or eliminating the 
collection and/or handling of identifiable biometric data. PETs can be used as a flexible 
instrument in the hands of a person making use of a system, providing this individual with 
personal and self-determined control over their sensitive information. The most far-reaching 
form of privacy-enhancing biometrics is the system-on-card construction, where biometrics 
are encapsulated in a personal device and do not leave this device. The second most privacy-
enhancing measure is the match-on-card system, where the data do not leave the card either 
but the sensor reading the data is external, and therefore located outside the personal device or 
card. This means that the user still has to trust that the reader and the system do not store any 
templates.  
However, biometrics can also be created in a more privacy-invasive way. We use the term 
‘privacy-invasive technology’ (PIT) when referring to a technology that invades personal 
privacy by maximizing or creating the collection and/or processing of identifiable biometric 
data. An obvious example would be the storage of information in a manner where medical or 
racial information can be inferred; for instance, storing the raw template is privacy invading. 
This currently only occurs in basic biometric systems that are, except in forensic DNA data-
bases, becoming outdated. Equally intrusive however is the use of individuals’ biometric data 
to link their pseudonymity or identity between different applications, domains, and databases. 
Unnecessary privacy intrusion occurs when a biometric system is used for identification, 
where verification would already have met the objectives of the application. Finally, the use 
of biometrics for surveillance purposes seems inherently privacy invasive, since data subjects 
have no control, and sometimes also no knowledge, over biometric data being processed.  
Several types of decisions in the development process of biometrics applications influence 
their becoming either PETs or PITs. These decisions are taken in the context of a complex 
process of balancing the interests of individuals to have control over their personal data and a 
series of other interests such as economic interests, policy and societal interests, security, but 
also convenience and efficiency interests. All these interests have a bearing on the use of 
biometrics and its relationship with data protection. 
This report identifies a series of possible criteria that can help to determine whether 
maximization of privacy has been a major factor in decisions on the design and use of 
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biometric applications. These criteria are: obligatory or voluntary nature of the application, 
choice of biometric, authentication or verification function, multi-factor system use, personal 
control, access to biometric data, room for function creep, data quality, and interoperability, 
linkability and profiling.  
With these criteria in mind, a number of case studies investigate the process of decision-
making regarding various large-scale as well as small-scale biometrics applications. These 
case studies concern technical decisions made in biometric pseudonyms and iris recognition, 
using cryptographic techniques for privacy enhancement; technical and organizational 
decisions made if a Privacy Impact Assessment is conducted in the development of a 
biometric application; decisions taken during the test stage of voice-recognition applications 
and the German ePass; and, finally, political decisions made about the central storage of 
biometric data outside travel documents.  
Together, these case studies show a differentiated picture of biometrics as PETs or PITs. New 
applications are developed and commercialized that are relatively privacy-enhanced, as the 
case study on biometric pseudonyms and iris recognition shows. However, as the two e-
passport cases show, despite the technical possibilities, many biometric applications are 
turned into PITs. It is often assumed that the drivers behind PITs are commercial gain as a 
result of a significant market interest in information collection, or political, often surveillance-
related, interests. Although these are major criteria in some contexts, they are by no means 
decisive reasons in many everyday contexts where biometrics are employed.  
One of the questions raised by our research is therefore, why, despite the technical 
possibilities – such as biometric pseudonyms – so few biometric applications are used as 
PETs. Technical, organizational, policy, and political decisions turn out to have a major 
influence on biometrics often becoming PITs. One explanation is that in the information 
economy as well as in today’s socio-political climate, the information-yielding potential of 
PIT applications seems to offer so many economic or political advantages that privacy 
arguments and PET alternatives pale in significance. However, another explanation is that 
there may be a lack of technical knowledge of privacy-preserving technologies at the stage 
where functional requirements for biometrics applications are specified, resulting in the 
creation of unnecessarily privacy-invasive biometrics.  
The possible gap identified in this report between expectations and assessments based on 
technical knowledge and between economic and political expectations of and requirements 
for biometric applications is very relevant for the development of the information society, in 
which biometrics is playing an increasingly vital role in identity management. It is 
recommended that further research, encompassing more and different types of case studies, is 
conducted to refine the tentative finding of the PET/PIT gap between technically-informed 
and politically-based decisions.  
In the meantime, it seems important that both public and private policy-makers become more 
acquainted with recent technical advances in the field of privacy-enhanced biometrics. Also, 
technical, organizational, and policy decisions should be more integrated, so that the develop-
ment of biometric applications takes place according to the notion of ‘value-sensitive design’. 
Increased awareness of the technical possibilities of PETs and the employment of value-
sensitive design can lead to better informed and more balanced choices when developing 
biometric applications, and therewith reverse the trend that is tentatively found in this report 
of the various types of decisions leading to biometrics becoming PITs rather than PETs.  
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AA  Active Authentication 
ABN AMRO  Algemene Bank Nederland Banking Consortium 
ART 29 WP  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
BAC  Basic Access Control 
BIR  Biometric Information Record 
BITKOM  German Association for Information Technology, Telecommunications 
and the New Media 
DoS  Denial of Service 
EAC  Extended Access Control 
EDPS  European Data Protection Supervisor 
EURODAC  Central Database for the comparison of fingerprints (Dublin 
Convention) 
FAR  False Accept Rate 
FNMR  False Non-Match Rate 
FRR  False Reject Rate 
FTE  Failure to Enrol 
HIDE  Homeland Security, Biometric Identification and Personal Detection 
Ethics 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization 
MRTD  Machine-Readable Travel Document 
OSEP  On-Line Secure E-Passport Protocol 
PET  Privacy Enhancing Technology 
PIA  Privacy Impact Assessment 
PIT  Privacy Invasive Technology 
PKI  Public Key Infrastructure 
PRIME  Privacy and Identity Management in Europe 
PRISE  PRIvacy and SEcurity 
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FIDIS research has focused on biometrics in, amongst others, the following deliverables: 
D3.2. (Study on PKI and biometrics), D4.1 (structured account of approaches on 
interoperability), D7.10 (multidisciplinary literature selection), D3.10 (biometrics in identity 
management) and D13.4 (Privacy Legal Framework on Biometrics). In addition, some other 
European consortia have published recent research that provides useful insights into aspects 
of biometrics, such as BIOVISION, (especially the Roadmap for Biometrics in Europe to 
2010), PRIME (Privacy and Identity Management in Europe), PRISE (PRIvacy and SEcurity) 
and HIDE (Homeland Security, Biometric Identification and Personal Detection Ethics). 
This deliverable builds on all of the above studies and FIDIS reviews of technologies that 
enhance privacy (such as in D13.1: identity and impact of privacy enhancing technologies). 
Today’s use of biometrics makes it very often a privacy-invasive technology (PIT), while 
there are ample possibilities, such as biometric pseudonyms, through which biometrics could 
be made into a privacy-enhancing technology (PET). The aim of this deliverable is to make a 
first assessment of the factors that play a role in policy decisions on biometric technology 
with privacy-invading and privacy-enhancing implications. 
We have therefore studied various cases to assess their PIT or PET content. Biometric 
applications have been grouped into five categories or types in FIDIS deliverable D3.10, and 
this categorization has also been used in D.3.14.1 We will categories individual biometrics 
applications in accordance with these categories, which we briefly repeat below. Although 
most biometric applications will belong to one specific group, it may occur that an application 
falls in two groups, for example the Centre Link and ABN AMRO voice recognition case 
studies fall in both Type II and Type IVb or IVc.  
Type I: Government-controlled ID model  
In this group, a public authority will take the initiative to collect the biometric data because of 
the identity verification or identification ability of the data, and include the data in an ID 
application, such as in ID cards, social security cards or passports. Control over the data could 
be central (Type Ia), divided over more than one organization but with appropriate 
agreements in place (Type Ib) or multilateral (without appropriate agreements for the 
disclosure or transfer of biometric data) (Type Ic). 
Type II: Access control model 
In this group, a public or private authority takes the initiative to collect the biometric data to 
secure the access to a physical place or an online application. Control over the data could be 
central or divided over more than one organization but with appropriate agreements in place 
(Type IIa and Type IIb) or divided such that the data subject shares the control (Type IIc). 
Type III: Mixed model 
In this group, the biometric data collected will be shared or exchanged amongst public and 
private authorities.  
                                                 
1 Kindt & Müller 2007; Müller & Kindt 2009.  
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Type IV: Convenience model 
In this group, either the data subject solely takes the decision to use biometrics for exclusive 
private convenience purposes (secure access to her house for authorized members) (Type IVa) 
or an organization uses biometrics for simplification of an administrative process with central 
or divided control (Type IVb and IVc).  
Type V: Surveillance model 
In this group, a public or private authority takes the initiative to collect and process the 
biometric data for surveillance purposes.  
 
We will thus use existing FIDIS research to label specific aspects of biometric applications as 
being PETs or PITs. We start our report with a summary of earlier FIDIS research findings 
related to biometrics and PETs (Ch. 2), and will then provide a more in-depth analysis of the 
concepts and definitions at issue (Ch. 3). This lays the groundwork for a number of case 
studies, which are large-scale and small-scale examples of current biometric applications (Ch. 
4-6). The survey of case studies leads to a first and tentative identification of key decision 
moments and factors in the adoption of biometric technologies in terms of their privacy-
enhancing or privacy-invasive impact. We tentatively assess the intended or unintended role 
of technical and political decisions in determining who controls the biometric systems, their 
functionalities and their purpose (Ch. 7).  
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2 Summary of earlier FIIDS research findings  
This deliverable builds on the findings of previous FIDIS deliverables, in particular the 
deliverables D3.2 and D3.6. First of all, basic terminology and biometric methods were 
introduced in the FIDIS deliverable D3.2, A Study on PKI and Biometrics.2 This deliverable 
has also analyzed legal principles relevant for the use of biometrics and resulting technical 
and organizational privacy aspects. In the FIDIS deliverable D3.6, Study on ID Documents, 
the use of biometrics in the context of Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs) has 
been analyzed with respect to security and privacy.3 This work also included a description of 
ISO standards for biometric raw data and templates concerning machine readable travel 
documents. Nevertheless, each of the fore-mentioned reports discussed biometrics in a rather 
specific context, i.e. the use of biometrics in a Public Key Infrastructure and the inclusion of 
biometrics in MRTDs. Deliverable D3.10 continued on this path and updated the analyzes 
which have been made in the previous documents, and to place biometrics and its use in a 
broader context of use of biometrics in public and private applications, from government 
controlled ID applications to purely private convenience applications.  
Biometrics is often used in applications to enhance the authentication and authorization of 
individuals, for example to obtain a travel document, or to access a building. If we look at the 
overview of the types of identity management systems as developed in FIDIS report D3.1: 
Structured Overview on Prototypes and Concepts of Identity Management Systems,4 we could 
reasonably say that it is likely that biometrics would most often be used in a Type 1 IMS for 
account management in order to enhance the authentication and authorization. Behavioral 
biometrics, i.e. the use of behavioral characteristics in biometric systems which may or may 
not identify a person and which will not be discussed in depth in this deliverable5 could 
probably also be used in a Type 2 IMS for profiling of user data by an organization. Finally, 
as the strict borders between the types of IMS are disappearing, it is correct to say that 
biometrics will also emerge in Type 3 IMS for user-controlled context-dependent role and 
pseudonym management. 
As already mentioned, D3.10 analyzed the deployment of biometrics from a technical, legal, 
security, organizational and forensic point of view in various applications and schemes for the 
management of identity and individuals in the public and private sector. It highlighted the 
security and privacy aspects of the use of biometric technologies, but also stressed the 
advantages which biometrics may offer. The deliverable concluded that the debate about the 
risks of biometrics should focus on where the control over the biometric system is exercised, 
and on the functionalities and purposes of the application. Besides that, attention should also 
concentrate on remaining research issues, such as health-related information in biometric data 
and revocability of biometrics. The document presented an approach on how to preserve 
privacy and to enhance security while using biometrics. The technical details of a biometric 
authentication process were described and illustrated in detail.6 It was also demonstrated that 
                                                 
2 Gasson et al. 2005.  
3 Meints & Hansen 2006.  
4 Bauer & Meints 2004. 
5 See for behavioral biometrics, Gasson et al. 2005, p. 82-90, and Hildebrandt 2009.  
6 Kindt & Müller 2007. 
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biometric data become an increasingly used key for interoperability of databases, without an 
appropriate regulation. To facilitate the discussion on biometrics, it was further proposed to 
make a classification of applications models which use biometrics, depending on differences 
in control, purposes, and functionalities. These application types, already explained in detail 
above, were the Type I – government controlled ID applications, the Type II – security and 
access control applications, the Type III – public/private partnership applications, the Type IV 
Convenience and personalization applications and the Type V – surveillance applications.7 
The distinction of the use of biometrics for verification and identification purposes was 
stressed and the research also showed that various technical aspects of biometric systems have 
not been taken into account in the legal treatment of biometrics. This results in a considerable 
‘margin of appreciation’ of national Data Protection Authorities in their opinions on biometric 
systems, whereby the proportionality principle plays an important role.8  
Finally, FIDIS deliverable D13.4 contained various country reports which illustrate that 
biometrics are not only applied in large-scale contexts and gradually entering daily life, but 
also that these biometric applications are often debated and criticized. Biometric data are in 
most cases personal data to which article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the data protection legislation apply. This 
legislation does not mention biometric data explicitly. D3.14 analyzed the gaps in the present 
legal framework and tackled the issues of the increasing use of biometric data in various 
identity management systems.9 In six country reports, the spreading of biometric applications 
and the applicable legislation has been discussed. The reports – by tackling similar key 
aspects of biometrics - illustrate how the gaps in the general legal framework are handled and 
provide useful suggestions for an appropriate legal framework for biometric data processing. 
Of course, the D13.4 deliverable reviewed the fundamental right to privacy and data 
protection which shall be assured to individuals as well as Directive 95/46/EC which provides 
more detailed rules on how to establish protection in the case of biometric data processing. It 
concluded that the present legal framework does not seem apt to cope with all issues and 
problems raised by biometric applications. It showed that the limited recent case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice sheds some light on some relevant 
issues, but does not answer all questions. The analysis of the use of biometric data and the 
applicable current legal framework in the six countries demonstrated that in many countries 
position is taken against the central storage of biometric data. The reports show that privacy 
invading aspects of storage and the various additional risks of such storage are important 
considerations in decisions made. Although, in some countries the risks of the use of 
biometric characteristics that leave traces are discussed the deliverable concludes that 
controllers of biometric applications receive limited clear guidance as to how to implement 
biometric applications. Conflicting approaches are observed, and the deliverable clearly 
shows that current legislation does not always provide an adequate answer. It concludes with 
some specific recommendations to policy makers and the legislator. These recommendations 
focus on the need for the regulation of central storage of biometric data as well as for 
transparency of biometric systems.  
                                                 
7 Ibid., p. 60 et seq.  
8 Ibid., p. 37 et seq.  
9 Only for specific large-scale biometric databases in the European Union, such as Eurodac, VIS, SIS 
II and the ePass, regulations containing specific but incomplete requirements for biometrics were 
enacted. 
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So, as a high-tech identification technology, biometrics has grown in maturity over the past 
years and is increasingly used for authentication in public and private applications. In general, 
research on biometrics has concentrated on the improvement of the technology and of the 
processes to measure the physical or behavioral characteristics of individuals for automated 
recognition or identification. Previous FIDIS research has not only analyzed these state-of-
the-art techniques and their technical strengths and weaknesses but also the privacy and 
security aspects of biometric applications in use. In the context of the individual deliverables, 
various and complementary analyzes of the use of biometrics were carried out from a multi-
disciplinary perspective. Biometric methodologies and specific technologies were analyzed 
and described,10 and the deployment of biometrics in various contexts, such as in a Public-
Key Infrastructure (PKI) structure or in Machine Readable Travel Documents have been 
researched and presented.11  
This report builds on all the above studies and FIDIS reviews of biometric technologies that 
enhance privacy. The findings of these deliverables confirm that today’s use of biometrics is 
mostly PIT, while there are possibilities such as biometric pseudonyms through which to 
create a PET. This deliverable makes a first step into finding out why this is the case. 
Therefore, a preliminary assessment of the factors that play a role in policy decisions on 
biometric technology is attempted. A distinction between technical and political decisions is 
made, and some criteria for assessing PIT or PET qualities are developed.  
                                                 
10 Gasson et al. 2005, p. 62 et seq. 
11 Meints & Hansen 2006. 
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3 Analysis of concepts and definitions 
3.1 Introduction 
When it comes to the relationship between technology and the law, it appears that technology 
can enforce or enhance the law, but it can also help to evade legal rules for processing 
information. When it comes to technology and information management, a rule of the thumb 
is that without conscious intervention, information sharing and monitoring tend to be 
promoted more by technology than information shielding.12 
In practice, as a particular information technology evolves, gradual adaptation to possibilities 
takes place. This has often resulted in a downgrading of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the past. At the same time, the desire to shield information may grow once the impact of 
the new technology on the privacy of individuals or certain groups becomes apparent. This 
may well be the phase in which we currently find ourselves in relation to the handling of 
biometric data.  
Decisions about the use of biometrics as PIT or PET are taken in the context of a complex 
process of balancing the interests of the individual to have control over her personal data and 
a series of other interests such as economic interests, policy/societal interests: security, 
freedom and so forth. All these interests also have a bearing on the use of biometrics and the 
relationship with existing data protection legislation.  
But what exactly do we mean by PET? Definitions of what constitute privacy-enhancing 
technologies differ considerable. A first important distinction often overlooked is between 
privacy-enhancing technologies and data security technologies. Data security measures are 
put in place to keep data safe, regardless of the legitimacy of processing. PETs seek to 
minimize or eliminate the use of personal data as a matter of principle, giving as much control 
as possible to the data subject. We use the term PET here referring to a variety of technologies 
that protect personal privacy by minimizing or eliminating the collection and/or handling of 
identifiable biometric data. Likewise, we use the term PIT referring to a variety of 
technologies that invade personal privacy by maximizing or creating the collection and/or 
handling of identifiable biometric data.  
Herbert Burkert has first developed a typology of different PETs based on whether the 
subject, the object, the transaction, or the system forms the target of the privacy enhancing 
technology.13 Subject oriented concepts seek to eliminate or reduce the capability to 
personally identify the acting subject. Object oriented concepts try to eliminate or minimize 
traces left by the objects of interpersonal transactions. Transaction oriented concepts seek to 
hide the transaction process and system oriented concepts seek to integrate some or all of the 
above. Charles Raab and Colin Bennett have argued that this classification is insightful but 
not very useful in assessing empirical examples.14 Building on Burkert, they distinguish 
between systematic instruments, collective instruments and instruments of individual 
empowerment. Systematic instruments arise from intended and unintended decisions of the 
designers of systems. Collective instruments are created as a result of government policy. 
                                                 
12 Koops 2009.  
13 Burkert 1997, p. 126-128.  
14 Bennett and Raab 2006, Ch. 7.  

Future of Identity in the Information Society (No. 507512) 
D3.16 
 




They are top-down applications where government or businesses consciously decide to build 
in privacy (or not). Instruments of individual empowerment are those where individuals can 
make an explicit choice with regard to their privacy. This classification of Bennett and Raab 
can be helpful in analyzing the PET or PIT decisions in the empirical biometric case studies in 
this deliverable.  
A complicating factor is that the combination of the concept of PET (privacy enhancing 
technology) and the use of biometrics (physical characteristics by which a person can be 
uniquely identified) is often regarded as a contradiction in terms. When one accepts the notion 
that a person’s biological characteristics form the core of a person’s fundamental identity, 
then any use of physical characteristics is privacy invading by default. In this view, technical 
measures (systematic instruments) can at most have a privacy damage limitation capacity but 
can never have privacy enhancing qualities. Similarly, the concept of PET in combination 
with the use of biometrics can be regarded as a contradiction in terms from the point of view 
of public policy (collective instruments) and security objectives. In this view, the desirability 
of the introduction of PETs as tools controlling individual biometric information (instruments 
of individual empowerment) should be challenged. PETs are regarded as being fundamentally 
at tenterhooks with the use of biometrics as an efficient instrument of public and security 
policy. From this perspective, perfect PETs may for example lead to technical and/or security 
inadequacies and prevent the straightforward track down of terrorists or fraudsters. 
In this deliverable, the point of departure is that the use of physical characteristics in 
combination with IT is in itself not necessarily privacy invading, as long as the system offers 
adequate protection against unjustified or disproportional use of these data. As already 
concluded in FIDIS Deliverable D3.10 (concluding remarks) an extended legal, social, 
economical and technical analysis of both positive and negative effects of biometrics on 
privacy should always take place. As biometrics are unique, unjustified or disproportional use 
of data as well as theft of biometric data will have a negative effect on the roll out of 
biometrics in the longer term. In that sense, there is a strong common interest in using 
biometrics as PET where possible and at some point privacy and security issues overlap.  
The definition used here of biometric PETs as ‘biometric technologies that protect personal 
privacy by minimizing or eliminating the collection and/or handling of identifiable biometric 
data’ can only become practically relevant once the concept of privacy has also been defined. 
Protecting personal privacy of course covers protecting personal information, but it clearly 
involves more than that. The literature on PETs as anonymization tools on the internet is a 
good classical example of this. The PET ‘encryption’ was set up as a personal privacy 
protection device. However, originally it was used to protect the content of messages, not the 
identity of the sender or receiver. Thus, the privacy enhancing capacity of the tool was not to 
anonymize (personal) details of the sender but to make the exchange of information that was 
taken place invisible for third parties. The tool was absolutely useless when it came to 
preventing that a third party could establish how often A was in contact with B. PET can 
therefore relate to safeguarding personal privacy both in the sense of personal information and 
personal identity. Of course, safeguarding personal privacy also covers safeguarding the 
quality of the information, such as the right (or the possibility) to correct or amend. 
Control is therefore a very important concept in the assessment of levels of privacy achieved. 
As the biometric identification function cannot be performed without the use of a (central or 
de-centralized) database, privacy-enhancing measures automatically concern the protection of 
biometric data that no longer are under the strict and full control of the individual. The way in 
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which data are stored centrally of course matters in terms of privacy protection.  
It is also crucial to make a distinction between the protection of biometric data stored within 
systems and the use of biometrics by operators to safeguard authorized access to other types 
of data stored in a system. Where PET is used as an integrated design into the system, and the 
owner of the system is responsible for its proper implementation and functioning, PETs can 
be used as controls (for example biometric operator access to a data bank). A further 
protection measure of this control function would be the use of a biometric in a multi 
dimensional or multi factor authentication situation. 
PETs can also be used as a flexible instrument in the hands of a person making use of a 
system, providing this individual with personal and self-determined control over their 
sensitive information (Bennett and Raab’s notion of an instrument of individual 
empowerment). In the management of privacy, this individual control can take three forms: 
choice, consent and correction. The measure of individual control creates an environment in 
which data are protected, and the individual can prevent that data are used in a certain way. 
The most far-reaching form of this type of measures relating to biometrics is the system-on- 
card construction, where biometrics encapsulated in a personal device do not leave this 
device. As discussed in FIDIS deliverable D3.10,15 performance may be an issue, and this 
biometric privacy enhancing architecture is currently an option for fingerprint and signature 
verification only. This is a totally self-containing system, keeping the reference and sample 
template on card as well as the matching process. There is therefore no opportunity to 
intervene with the card, except in the communication between the card and the card reader 
after matching. The second most far-reaching measure is the match-on-card construction. 
Here, the data do not leave the card either, but the sensor reading the data is external and 
therefore located outside the personal device or card. This means that the user still has to trust 
that the reader and the system do not store any templates. 
In assessing the exact meaning of the label ‘privacy enhancing technology’, and its 
relationship with control by the individual, it is helpful to make the distinction between the 
two concepts of ‘privacy’ and the ‘management of privacy’. This distinction has first been 
developed by Tavani and Moore.16 They define the concept of privacy in terms of the 
protection from intrusion and information gathering. The very absolute objective of privacy 
enhancing technology would be the simple goal that as little information as possible is 
gathered, used or stored. Adhering to this concept of privacy results in a strict separation of 
the use of biometrics in commercial transactions, administrative purposes and law 
enforcement (sectoral boundaries). An example would be the German decision (collective 
instrument in Bennett’s and Raab’s terminology) to refrain from creating databases of the 
biometric data contained in German passports. The concept of control is applied to the use of 
measures that provide privacy protection and general management of privacy on aspects such 
as quality of the information, right to correct and so forth. The use of biometrics as a control 
mechanism (PET) allows an individual a say in the trade-off between privacy and security in 
any particular circumstance (this corresponds with Bennett’s and Raab’s instruments of 
individual empowerment). 
As a basis for an analysis of the privacy problems of biometrics problems of biometric 
                                                 
15 Kindt & Müller 2007, section 6.2.2. 
16 Tavani & Moor 2001.  
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systems, earlier FIDIS deliverables (especially D3.2 and D3.10) have started from the issues 
which were described in the authoritative opinion of the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party (Article 29 WP) on biometrics.17 The privacy problems identified have been subjected 
to further analysis in FIDIS report D3.2: A study on PKI and biometrics.18 The overview of 
the privacy problems given in that 2003 working document of the Article 29 Working Party 
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17 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Biometrics, 1 August 2003. 
18 Gasson et al. 2005.  
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Art. 14 (a) 
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appropriate back-up 
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Table 1. Overview of privacy risks of biometrics based on Art 29 WP Working 
document 
Almost all of the privacy concerns in the table above, in fact relate to biometric Type I , II and 
III models as described in FIDIS Deliverable D3.10. The risks also relate most often to the 
place of storage of the biometrics: when biometric characteristics are stored in a central place, 
privacy risks increase dramatically. Despite warnings of the Art 29 Working Party in another 
(2005) working document19 that setting up a centralized database containing personal data and 
in particular biometric data of all (European) citizens could infringe the proportionality 
principle, central storage developments can be detected. The arguments and privacy 
implications will be assessed in the case studies on the German and Dutch passport in this 
deliverable.  
Based on the literature,20 we will detail some basic notions of what constitute privacy 
enhancing and potential privacy invasive features of biometric applications here.  
To integrate PET into the design of the biometrical systems there are basically two ways: 
decentralization of the template storage and verification and/or encryption of template-
databases (in case of central storage). By decentralization of both the template storage and 
verification process, the biometrical data are processed in an environment controlled by the 
individual or an environment from which no connection to a central database can be made. In 
case of central template storage and verification, mathematical manipulation (encryption 
algorithms or hash-function) can ensure encryption of databases so that it is not possible to 
relate the biometric data to other data stored in different databases, at different locations.21 In 
the case of EURODAC,22 the PET aspect is the HIT-No HIT facility, where no information is 
exchanged except the mere fact whether or not there was a hit; however, in the case of a hit, 
biometrics are subsequently de-encrypted so that they can lead back to the other personal 
details of the person involved. As the whole point of these systems is to identify individuals 
                                                 
19 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion on Implementing the Council Regulation (EC) 
N° 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports 
and travel documents issued by Member States, 30 September 2005. 
20 Hes, Hooghiemstra & Borking 1999; Hes 2000; BECTA 2007; Koorn et al. 2004; Andronikou, 
Demetis & Varvarigou 2007; Wright 2007; Grijpink 2006.  
21 The Canadian Data Commissioner Cavoukian is one of the most pronounced advocates of the use of 
encryption: see Cavoukian 2007, who concludes: ‘While introducing biometrics into information 
systems may result in considerable benefits, it can also introduce many new security and privacy 
vulnerabilities, risks, and concerns. However, novel biometric encryption techniques have been 
developed that can overcome many, if not most, of those risks and vulnerabilities, resulting in a win-
win, positive-sum scenario. One can only hope that the biometric portion of such systems is done well, 
and preferably not modelled on a zero-sum paradigm, where there will always be a winner and a loser. 
A positive-sum model, in the form of biometric encryption, presents distinct advantages to both 
security AND privacy’ (p. 31).  
22 On EURODAC, see http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_ 
movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33081_en.htm; see also Van der Ploeg 1999.  
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and link them to existing data, the use of a database and the possibility to link databases 
seems unavoidable.  
The one-off use of fingerprints in medical screening is a biometric application that enhances 
privacy. This makes having to use patient names to match with their diagnostic results 
unnecessary. There is a double advantage in the one-off use of biometrics in this instance: 
patients can remain anonymous and there is greater reassurance that data are released to the 
correct person. Another obvious example is the already mentioned measure of biometric 
authentication to restrict operator use in a database. This use of biometrics makes operators 
more accountable for any use/misuse of data. A more generic example is the match on card-
sensor on card: biometric authentication without the biometric characteristics leaving devices 
owned by the individual.23 Biometric cryptography is a privacy enhancing technical solution 
that integrates an individual’s biometric characteristics in a one way or two way 
cryptographic key. The two way method now forms an integral part of all but the cheapest 
biometric applications on the commercial market. When the key is two way, this introduces 
issues relating to function creep and law enforcement. At the same time, there are possibilities 
for a three-way check to come to an architectural design that restricts the number of people 
having access to data. There are also applications that offer two-way verification and 
therefore integrate the ‘trust and verify’ security principle.24 Another PET possibility would 
lie in the certification of the privacy compliance of biometrical identification products; this is 
therefore not a PET but a certification of the biometric application as a PET. 
When we concentrate on biometrics as a privacy invading technology an obvious example 
would be the storage of information in a manner where medical or racial information can be 
inferred. Storage of the raw template is privacy invading and only occurs in very basic 
biometric systems. The handling of raw data will soon become a relic of the past. New 
technologies have been developed both to improve the possibilities created by encryption and 
in overcoming the problems of false positives because of noise.25 Equally intrusive is the use 
of an individual’s biometric data to link their pseudonymity or identity between different 
applications or databases. Another example is the use of biometrics for surveillance, where no 
permission is asked to take (moving) images of people for example of face recognition 
systems. Systems with central storage of raw biometric data or of templates can, depending on 
the specifications of the system, turn into covert identification systems. Then there are 
biometric systems aiming for interoperability, maybe even using a biometric as a unique 
identifiable key (instead of another personal detail such as the name (alphabetical identifier) 
or a number (numerical identifier). These systems are built on as much identifiability (thus 
privacy intrusion) as possible and they link data that would otherwise go unconnected. Also 
very privacy intrusive is a privacy invading choice for biometric identification. To be more 
precise: the use of a biometric system for identification, where verification would already 
have met the objectives of the application. 
                                                 
23 This type of biometric application has been recommended by the FIIDIS consortium in report 
D3.14, see Müller & Kindt 2009.  
24 Many of these privacy-enhancing possibilities were already mentioned in the groundbreaking 1999 
study on biometrics by the Registratiekamer, see Hes et al. 1999, p. 49-70. 
25 See, for example, www.priv-ID.com, and the iris case study in this deliverable. 
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3.2 A set of criteria to assess privacy-enhancing features 
On the basis of these examples and the earlier FIDIS work, in this section we will describe a 
series of possible criteria that can help determine whether maximization of privacy has been a 
major determinator in decisions on the use of biometric applications. They are in a non-
preferential order: obligatory or voluntary nature of the application, choice of biometric, 
authentication or verification function, Multi-factor system use, personal control, access to 
biometric data, room for function creep, data quality, and finally, interoperability, linkability 
and profiling.  
3.2.1 Obligatory or voluntary nature 
An important element in any assessment of privacy aspects of the use of biometrics is whether 
providing biometric samples is obligatory or voluntary for the individual concerned. If it is 
voluntary, the individuals asked to provide their characteristic could refuse this and use 
another facility, for example another swimming pool not using a biometric entry system or the 
individual can make use of a similar service without the biometric at the same institution (for 
example, the use of a call center and passwords as an alternative to voice recognition when 
managing your bank account). When there is an alternative way to obtain the services offered 
then the element of choice, consent and control is in the hand of the individual. Here 
information is a key factor. The users of biometric systems often fail to realize the 
implications of offering their characteristics for storage on a database, and the loss of 
individual control over their characteristics once this has happened. Rights, such as the right 
to correct, are seldom exercised and other remain unused. In Type 1 government-controlled 
ID models involving biometrics in electronic documents, participation is more or less 
obligatory and individual consent and choice cannot play a role.26 Theoretically, in the case of 
a biometric passports, there is of course the option of choosing not to apply for one, but this is 
not a serious alternative as the harm of not enrolling is substantial (in this case: not being able 
to travel outside the EU). When there is no real alternative to the use of a biometric apart from 
(social) exclusion, and this is the case with most public sector introductions of biometrics, the 
biometric characteristic has to be presented. 
3.2.2 Choice of biometric to be presented 
The second of the defining criteria is the choice of the biometric to be presented. The impact 
on privacy of the main biometrics used in commercial applications is diverse. This is summed 
up in Tables 2 and 3.  
 
                                                 
26 See Introna and Nissenbaum 2009, p. 47, on the notion of meaningful consent.  
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Table 2. Characteristics of different biometrics. Source: OECD 2004 
 
 
 Table 3. Advantages and disadvantages. Source: OECD 2004 
 
As the FIDIS study on PKI and biometrics has shown,27 from a technological and economic 
perspective, biometric applications chosen for authentication and verification depend on the 
following factors: quality (low false acceptance rates (FAR), tamper resistance and privacy 
compliance), Convenience (easy and quick enrolment, use and maintenance, low false 
rejection rate (FRR) and costs for the infrastructure needed. The study concluded that many 
questions with respect to the implementation of privacy criteria are still open from the 
perspective of currently available commercial solutions. To what extent biometrics collected 
now may yield privacy critical information in future, for example concerning health still 
                                                 
27 Gasson et al. 2005.  
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needs a considerable research effort of which only economic gain or social government 
priorities can be the driver. The FIDIS PKI study has also made clear that the ‘magic’ triangle 
defined by (1) quality, (2) convenience and (3) costs is always a compromise with focus on 
one, or at best two factors, with the remaining factor(s) showing considerable weaknesses. As 
to the choice of biometrics, and international standards applying, such as fingerprinting, 
biometric methods and data used for forensic purposes have been highly standardized. Others 
suffer from lack of standardization such as face recognition and hand geometry. If quality is 
important in the choice of biometric, then one of the criteria to determine quality is privacy. 
Some technical features protecting privacy such as algorithms or templates formats may be 
subject to patents or copyrights, the privacy and convenience aspects and costs of using the 
iris for example, have been competing values.  
3.2.3 Authentication or verification 
Whether a biometric application is used for identification or verification is very relevant for 
an assessment of privacy enhancing options available. This distinction separates biometric 
systems aimed at bringing about automated identification of a particular person and those 
aimed at verification of a claim made by a person who presents him or herself. As the 
identification function requires a one-to-many comparison whilst the verification function 
requires a one-to-one comparison, privacy risks involved in the use of the biometric 
technology vary considerably from application to application. In principle, the verification 
function permits the biometric characteristic to be stored locally, even under the full control 
of the individual, so that the risk that the biometric data are used for other purposes is limited. 
This does not mean that all biometric systems that could be restricted to serving the 
verification function have actually been designed to maximize the control of the individual 
over her biological data. Most private biometric applications been introduced for verification 
purposes (mainly to grant authorized persons access to physical or digital spaces). Control 
over personal data in these situations needs to be clarified, and the legal conditions 
determining the handling of data as well as the enforcement of applicable law are issues that 
need scrutiny. 
The integration of biometrics in electronic documents issued by the government, which is an 
application of the government controlled ID model (Type 1), presents privacy issues relating 
to the verification and authentication function. If biometrics are stored in central database, it is 
very likely that this database will be attacked at some point. The larger the database, the more 
attractive it will be for hackers and/or thieves to break into. Such attacks may have several 
purposes, one of them obviously identity theft. A second aspect to a central database is the 
possibility of function creep, which will be discussed below. 
The use and storage of templates is only a very partial solution as templates can also be 
stolen, and once stolen, they could still be used by an impostor. Therefore, the use of 
biometrics to secure and authenticate in a reliable way through the use of uniquely encrypted 
templates has made so much progress. Once stolen, encrypted templates can be revoked and 
replaced. Although this does solve the storage problem of reference tokens, it does not solve 
the problem of leakage in the biometric processing from the capture to the comparison 
component. Decentralization of critical data, user control and encapsulation of the whole 
processing into a tamper resistant device are all technical measures that can be taken to 
minimize the risk.  
To assess the place awarded to privacy in decision-making, an obvious method is to evaluate 
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the proportionality of the use and the used functionality of the biometric data. Biometrics will 
in general be used to enhance the security of an application. However, because of the risks 
associated with biometrics as explained above, in particular also in relation with the type of 
control that is exercised over the biometric system (central, divided, multilateral), the use of 
biometric data shall be carefully designed and biometric data will only be used in cases where 
no other means are available to guarantee the same level of security. Furthermore, for most 
applications, the verification function of a biometric system will do. 
3.2.4 Personal Control 
The advantages of biometrics are sometimes assumed known rather than spelled out. 
Obviously, biometrics remain an undeniably unique tool to link an individual to documents or 
claims and as such further technological development and efficient use of this new technology 
provide exciting options. The concept of encapsulated biometrics is often introduced as a 
method to make use of the advantages whilst minimizing privacy and security risks. 
According to this concept, the biometric data remain under the control of the data subject, and 
the data subject has increased decision powers as to when and for what purposes its 
biometrics are going to be used. To what extent does the individual retain control over their 
biometrics? By perfect use of biometrics in this sense, an environment is created in which 
data can be protected by the individual, including the possibility to prevent that data are used 
in a certain way, thus exercising powers of control, consent or even correction. This requires 
the sensor-on-card construction, where biometrics encapsulated in a personal device do not 
leave this device. To achieve this not only the data but also the sensor reading the data 
remains on the card. A match-on-card system is already less perfect, as although the data do 
not leave the card, the sensor reading the data is external, and therefore located outside the 
personal device or card, leaving more possibilities for data transfer outside the control of the 
individual.  
In terms of individual control, the revocability of biometrics is important for all biometric 
models mentioned above, but it is clear that it is most crucial in the Type I government 
controlled ID model, where the use of the biometric identifier is mandatory for individuals in 
ID related documents. It is also important in the Type II a and b Access model and the Type 
III Mixed model, as the biometric can be used in different kinds of documents and tokens in 
relations with the government and/or private organizations for access purposes, e.g., to e-
government services or commercial banking. If the biometric has been compromised and it 
cannot be revoked, the relations of the individual with the government and other concerned 
organizations will become severely damaged, if not impossible. Revocability is less of an 
issue for the Type IVa Convenience model, as an individual could in that case still choose to 
no longer use the biometric application (e.g., for access to the house, etc) or, in case the 
template is compromised, and cannot be replaced, change to another method for 
authentication. If the biometric system is compromised, the user may eliminate it from the 
authentication process. Revocability is intrinsically realized in Type IIc models 
(‘encapsulated biometrics’), where the biometric template data is never accessible to persons 
other than the owner. A lost or out of date device incorporating such data cannot be abused as 
the data can technically not leave the device. Once a device that carries an ‘encapsulated 
biometric’ system is out of service, the stored biometric data is lost and thus revoked. 
3.2.5 Multi factor system 
Identity theft with the use of biometric information, especially of fingerprints, can take place 
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in many ways such as gaining access to a databank, theft of traces unknowingly left. In fact, 
biometric data cannot be used to secure or to authenticate because they can be intercepted 
easily. The strength of biometrics could be based on the fact that it provides a convenient 
piece of unique information that someone always has. However, as it will always remain 
subject to a risk of misappropriation, it should in a particular system be combined with other 
authentication information (such as a secret knowledge of an access number), as multiple 
authentication will render the system more secure and attack proof. The strengthening of the 
authentication procedure rather than the creation of an alternative and more reliable procedure 
should in fact be considered as a main purpose of use of biometric characteristics in private 
applications. As a solution to this problem, the use of biometrics in combination with 
additional, revocable factors of authentication such as possession or knowledge have been 
suggested in the late 1990s foremost by Cavoukian,28 but it has since been taken up by other 
authors [13] and is held up as a relevant measure [14]. Nevertheless, many of today’s systems 
do not implement biometrics in a revocable way. One example of this is the European 
passport.[17] The reason seems to be that currently no standardized and cost efficient solution 
is available that can be easily integrated into the various biometric systems.  
 
3.2.6 Access to biometric data stored on RFID chip 
The intended usage of the documents often determines their structure and limits their potential 
for including biometrics. Nowadays, travel documents are often no more than a paper booklet 
containing an integrated RFID chip with limited functionality; while the majority of the 
European national eID cards are smart cards with extended computational capabilities; e.g., 
many eID cards can be used to generate electronic signatures for strong authentication or to 
create legally binding signatures. Tamperproof smart cards offer more flexibility to include 
biometrics in a secure and privacy-friendly way than RFID chips. 
Biometrics add security to applications because they provide a stronger link between the card 
and the card holder, thus between the physical and the electronic identity. Biometric data that 
are stored on a contactless chip need to be sufficiently secured in order to prevent unwanted 
disclosure of the data contained therein. FIDIS and other authors have strongly advocated the 
use of appropriate security measures to avoid tracking and eavesdropping of the personal 
biometric data stored on media which involve new technologies such as RFID.29 This issue 
has become very important, because the use of a contactless chip has been agreed for the issue 
of the so-called e-passports, following the ICAO specification for Machine Readable Travel 
Documents in May 2004, and confirmed and mandated in the 2252/2004 Regulation. The 
vulnerability of the biometric data stored on the RFID chip has been proven by documented 
attacks on the e-passport in several countries, including Germany, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and Belgium.30  
                                                 
28 In several papers, Cavoukian held that the most important step to achieve privacy protection was to 
encrypt all biometric data, and to destroy all original biometric data, see for example, Cavoukian 1999.  
29 FIDIS, Budapest Declaration on Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs), Future of Identity 
in the Information Society, 2006, available on http://www.fidis.net. (Unless otherwise noted, all URLs 
in this report were last accessed on 10 July 2009.) 
30 For the first overview, see Meints & Hansen 2006.  
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3.2.7 Room for function creep 
This brings us to the third criterion, the possibilities for function creep. The example of 
EURODAC illustrates the relevance of this criterion. Access to EURODAC, which serves as 
a system for comparing fingerprints of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, has now been 
opened to law-enforcement agencies such as Europol. This permission also applies to those 
fingerprints that were provided by those seeking political asylum in the EU before this access 
for law-enforcement agencies was granted. This is an example of biometric identifier function 
creep. In many countries, controllers of private applications that store biometric charact-
eristics can be forced to disclose biometric data when requested to do so by the appropriate 
legal authorities under criminal law. Existing literature on the European wide introduction of 
biometric technologies in the public sector shows that the core problem is that government 
demand is focusing on surveillance, control and fraud detection instead of security and risk 
mitigation. The general consensus is that in the public sector, function creep is a logical 
development when the emphasis is on surveillance and control and therefore on tracking, 
identifying and controlling individuals. This poses the question whether it is useful to 
consider PET possibilities of biometric technology when in public information management 
and law enforcement linking of data will be such an obvious policy goal.  
Thus, in the absence of a longer term design for the management of information, it is safe to 
assume that the proliferation of biometrics makes individual biometric data more accessible. 
Political or management decisions can be made regarding the use of biometric data to use the 
technology in a privacy invasive manner. Instances of function creep, such as the above 
mentioned example of the use of biometric data collected for immigration purposes used in 
the context of unrelated criminal investigations31, occur in the private sector also. To give 
examples: biometric applications first introduced with the purpose of fast and efficient entry 
of employees or customers can be used for time registration or customer profiling at a later 
stage. Here the information given to customers and legal rights to be informed and the right to 
correct come into play. In addition, some paradigm shifts that are beneficial to privacy 
protection can also be observed. The most notable is the change in the technology used for 
access control of the European passport, from the right to access: basic access control 
(unencrypted face stored) to the privilege to inspect: extended access control (encrypted 
fingerprint images). This has made skimming of passport details more difficult and has 
enhanced the privacy of the passport holder compared to the past. To conclude: function creep 
(as a process by which data are used for different purposes than originally collected for) is a 
trend that is strengthened by the information exchange interface between new technologies 
and ICT. This combination has an attraction that for governments is difficult to resist. 
However, the tendency to use data for other purposes than they were originally collected for32 
can be observed in the public, but also in the semi-public and private domain. Strict 
legislation can make it more difficult for function creep to occur, but can never completely 
prevent it. 
                                                 
31 See: an interesting ruling on the use of databases of 18th December 2008: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/dec/ecj-databases-huber.pdf 
32 Opening up the EURODAC site to police and other law-enforcement agencies is the most striking 
European example of this.  
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3.2.8 Data quality 
One of the basic principles of the data protection legislation as set forth in Directive 95/46/EC 
on the protection of personal data is the data quality. The principle requires that the personal 
data must be ‘accurate, and, where necessary, kept up to date’; furthermore, ‘every 
reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having 
regard to the purposes for which they were collected or for which they are further processed, 
are erased or rectified’.33  
This legal requirement with regard to the data quality poses a problem for specific forms of 
biometric data which relate to a human characteristic that changes over time, for example, if 
the individual grows older. The reference biometric data relating to hand geometry or the face 
of younger persons, for example pupils of a school, at a certain point may not be of good 
quality anymore, as the characteristics change and these changes are not reflected in the 
reference data. This problem has been recognized in relation to the use of the facial image of 
children for the use of identity documents in a study performed for the Ministry of the Interior 
in the Netherlands in 2005. The report stated that ‘it is very likely that facial recognition of 
children of twelve years or younger, on the basis of a reference image that is some years old, 
is problematic. The reason is the significant changes in the proportions of the characteristic 
points in the face during growth. These changes take place after a complex process that is to a 
large extent determined by the sex and genetic background’.34 The data quality of the 
reference biometric data of younger persons (for example, under eighteen) is therefore a 
concern, not only from a practical point of view, but also under the data protection legislation, 
which imposes requirements for the quality of the data, in particular that the data shall be 
accurate. In some European countries, biometric applications have been promoted in schools 
or other environments involving children, for convenience and other purposes (for example 
the lending of books)35. Under some circumstances, reference data will need to be replaced at 
regular intervals with new reference data by a new enrolment of the data subject. If this would 
not be possible, the data shall not be used any longer and is to be erased. According to FIDIS 
Deliverable D3.14 the administrative and operational requirements for such replacement and 
the consequences of this principle is most important for the biometric Type I government 
controlled ID model; the importance remains but decreases in the biometric Type II Access 
model, the Type III mixed model and the Type IV convenience model.  
Various privacy problems in relation to the quality of biometrics can also occur, such as the 
difficulties in achieving sufficient data quality or the fact that not only captured biometric 
samples but also the biometric templates may contain sensitive information about someone’s 
health. There still is a lack of overview of biometric methods and related information about 
someone’s health condition in captured biometric samples. One of the privacy problems that 
needs further investigating is the data quality of specific biometric data, such as face scan and 
hand geometry, for specific groups of people. It may well be that certain groups carry a higher 
risk of having inaccurate or outdated biometric data processed about them. 
                                                 
33 Article 6.1 (d) of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. 
34 BZK 2005. 
35 See, for example, the debate about the use of biometrics in schools in the United Kingdom, Müller 
& Kindt 2009 (country study UK). 
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3.2.9 Right to object 
If biometrics are used by a private owner for access control purposes, e.g., to a place open to 
the public such as a health club or swimming pool, the public interest (securing (public) 
order) is often invoked, or the interests of the controller, outweighing the interests of the 
individuals.36 Directive 95/46/EC states that especially if the processing is based on these 
grounds, the data subjects should have the right to ‘object at any time on compelling 
legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation’ to the processing, unless the national 
legislation states otherwise.37 Legitimate grounds could be the contention that biometric data 
include sensitive data, difficulties to enroll, or also religious belief.  
The right to object, the principle of the right of individuals to object to the processing of data, 
shall be taken into account in the discussions about biometrics in the way that alternatives for 
use of a biometric system will always have to be provided. This will be especially true for the 
biometric Type II access models operated by a private organization. For biometric Type II 
access models operated by a government, e.g., for e-government services, the use of 
alternatives is feasible, though complicated and will cause inefficiency. The use of alternative 
means for biometric Type I government controlled ID models, will be more difficult still. It 
has to be accepted that biometric systems will never include all individuals to whom it might 
be directed, privacy enhancing applications will take account of this observation. Appropriate 
specifications as to when somebody is entitled to object to become enrolled in a biometric 
system can form part of a package of PET measures.  
3.2.10 Direct identification ability, interoperability, linkability and 
profiling 
In addition to the privacy threats and ethical concerns described above, biometrics might also 
raise concerns of linkability, disclosure of additional health information and unobserved 
verification or identification.  
Templates, which are used for a specific application and stored on a local or central place, are 
often linked with other personal data such as name and address. In most cases, an individual is 
even unable to influence her biometric characteristics without harming herself. It is therefore 
difficult to deny or to hide biometric properties. For governments and identity management 
system operators, biometrics offer the unique possibility to authenticate individuals that are 
uncooperative and even to prove to an impostor her true identity (negative authentication). 
Biometrics is the only authentication concept with this quality. In a world where identity theft 
becomes a serious threat for whole populations, biometric properties become the crucial 
factor for secure authentication. The potential use of biometrics in this way inherently holds 
risks for the privacy and the social life of a user. The lifetime of a typical identity credential 
should be shorter or at least not exceed the lifetime of a typical identity record in an IMS of a 
biometric system. For biometric templates used as identity credentials, this is clearly not the 
case. Most biometric characteristics remain identical for a long time and some of the 
characteristics even remain unchanged for a full lifetime of a person. In addition, individuals 
have to use the same biometric characteristic as a biometric credential in many different 
authentication situations. A corrupted biometric credential can severely harm a person. There 
is naturally no revocation list for corrupted or out of date biometric characteristic and 
                                                 
36 See Article 7(e) and (f) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
37 Article 14(a) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
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properties. Therefore biometric data should never run the risk of corruption or disclosure to 
non-authorized entities. As already discussed above, states and large organizations collect and 
store huge amounts of biometric data from their citizens or members in large databases. 
Nobody can guarantee that such data can be fully protected against attack. A further drawback 
of centralized databases is the limitation on scalability. Depending on the technology, 
biometric template databases have collisions between individual templates already with a few 
hundred or thousands of Biometric Information Records (BIRs). This can lead to confusion of 
persons with potentially dramatic consequences for innocent people. The choice whether or 
not to store centrally and to opt for technical possibilities for interoperability, linkability, 
profiling, sharing of data all have a bearing on whether biometric will actually be used as a 
PIT or PET. 
3.3  Conclusion 
Privacy enhancing technologies refer to a variety of technologies that protect personal privacy 
by minimizing or eliminating the collection of identifiable data. PETs can help to give 
individuals as much control as possible over the processing of their data. PET is broader than 
just the protection of information, as it also concerns technological possibilities to improve 
the quality of the information and the technological possibilities to access and correct 
personal information. The use of biometrics as PET will always have to be balanced against 
other interests. This interest can be the need to provide security for society but also security or 
convenience of the individual concerned. Too much PET may cause an individual another 
type of invasion of privacy in the long term because she cannot be protected against the 
negative effects of identity fraud. PETs are only useful when integrated into the security of a 
system. Using revocable cryptography to store biometric data but leaving access to the 
database unsecured would be potentially privacy invasive. Proliferation of biometrics makes 
individual biometric data more accessible and more linkable to other personal data in 
principle. Responsible management and control of personal data does therefore not only stand 
or fall with using biometrics as a PET where possible. Without security of systems, sectoral 
boundaries, clear objectives, exclusion of function creep, delineation of the target group and 
external supervision, biometric data become vulnerable to abuse. These factors are therefore 
as important as the possible technical measures that maximize the privacy of the person 
providing biometric characteristics. Within the relevant constraints, the use of biometrics as 
PET can be stimulated and enforced. Some of the criteria affecting the potential of the use of 
biometrics as PIT or PET affecting privacy in biometric applications have been listed. In the 
following chapters, we will look at some concrete cases and decisions in more detail. 
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4 Early-stage decisions 
4.1 Technical decisions: biometric pseudonyms and iris 
recognition 
More and more applications rely on biometrics to authenticate or identify physical persons. 
Biometric data are intrinsically sensitive and vulnerable in today’s applications:38 if they are 
stolen, their owners have currently no choice but to revoke them (where possible) to avoid 
future fraudulent use. In doing so, they lose all advantages linked to this biometric in terms of 
convenience and security.  
We present the general ideas of biometric pseudonyms, followed by a short presentation of 
the basic ideas of a technique which allows developing biometric pseudonyms – using the 
example of iris recognition – in order to overcome major threats for security, privacy and 
convenience in today’s use of biometrics. The present approach has been studied in the 
BioCrypt project, which led to a patent in 2009.39 
The project BioCrypt focused on deriving biometric pseudonyms from iris recognition 
images. A proof of concept has been implemented. Note however, that the main ideas 
developed and patented are general enough to be used for other biometric data as well, e.g. 
fingerprint. 
In a similar direction, the EU project TURBINE40 (TrUsted Revocable Biometric IdeNtitiEs) 
focuses on fingerprints and ‘will hence provide the assurance that: 
1. the data used for the authentication, generated from the fingerprint, cannot be used to 
restore the original fingerprint sample 
2. the individual will be able to create different ‘pseudo-identities’ for different applications 
with the same fingerprint, whilst ensuring that these different identities (and hence the 
related personal data) cannot be linked to each other, and 
3. the individual is enabled to revoke an identity for a given application in case it should not 
be used anymore.’41 
These three points are also satisfied by our approach, as discussed below. 
The central point is the creation of biometric pseudonyms. This first section, after 
reconsidering some general concepts of biometrics, describes what such pseudonyms are and 
why they are needed. The second section focuses on how they can be created, for example in 
the case of the iris. We consider the implications of this technology from the user’s 
perspective. It also explains how our innovation seeks to offer all the benefits of iris 
recognition in terms of security and convenience while ensuring the privacy of biometric data 
and its related personal information. 
                                                 
38 See also Gasson et al. 2005 on possible threats and attacks. 
39 Patent submission for European patent n. 08169061.2. For more information on BioCrypt, see 
http://labs.hti.bfh.ch/biocrypt.  
40 http://www.turbine-project.eu/.  
41 From http://www.turbine-project.eu/.  
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4.1.1 Biometrics and pseudonyms 
4.1.1.1 Advantages and disadvantages of biometrics 
There is little need to present here the complete list of advantages and of problems arising 
with the use of biometrics like for example iris recognition, as the main issues have already 
been discussed in the FIDIS project.42 Biometrics enable the automatic recognition of human 
beings with speed and reliability. Applications as means of authorization are numerous, from 
physical access to buildings and rooms to logical access to services and computer resources. 
In the context of the information society, it makes the secure remote identification of citizens 
over a network possible. 
Moreover, biometrics offer much convenience to its users. Passwords and PINs are easily 
forgotten or disclosed; keys, cards and tokens can be lost or stolen. Biometric traits, unlike 
secrets and possessions, accompany us wherever we go. We do not need to remember nor 
maintain them.43 
Biometric technologies can facilitate life in many ways. For instance, you could go jogging 
with nothing more than your clothes on, buy some refreshment that you pay thanks to your 
fingerprint, then go back home and unlock your door through retina scan. Or, if you are a 
frequent flyer, you could save lots of time by bypassing immigration control and passport 
presentation if you are registered in a system for automated border-crossing using iris 
recognition.44 
Yet, no biometric technology is perfect, i.e. achieves exactly 0% error rates. Every biometric 
system is only as strong as its enrolment process and can be the target of many attacks.45 
However, we will focus on how the use of biometrics can affect our privacy. This takes us to 
the next section.  
4.1.1.2 Unlinkability of personal information 
To understand the impact of biometrics on the protection of our private life, we have to 
realize how our personal digital information is collected and processed. The figure below 
depicts our identity as a set of attributes that characterizes us. Partial identities are subsets of 
these attributes that are known about us in different contexts (at work, when shopping, during 
leisure time, and so on). Some of this information is stored in a digital form in various 
databases. 
                                                 
42 See especially Gasson et al. 2005 and Kindt & Müller 2007. See also supra, Ch. 2.  
43 Besides a few behavioral biometrics, e.g. signature or gait. 
44 This application is taken from Daugman's webpage at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~jgd1000/. 
45 See e.g. http://www.iris-recognition.org/counterfeit.htm on the secureness of biometric systems. 
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The key to privacy is choosing what personal data to disclose depending on the context46 and 
knowing who knows what about us.47 An important threat to privacy is the linking of some or 
all of our identity-related information without our consent or knowledge. As we can see in the 
figure above, most partial identities have one or more attributes in common. Mathematically 
speaking, linking grossly corresponds to the union of non-disjoint partial identities on 
condition that the elements at the intersection of these sets match. 
Now some types of attributes can be more or less distinctive within a given group of persons, 
making it more or less difficult to link partial identities. For instance, our full name may 
unequivocally identify us within our family and company, but usually not within our country 
of residence, let alone the whole world. This is where biometrics come into play. 
A biometric trait such as the iris can be potentially used like a globally unique identifier. This 
means that if we use the same biometric, say the right iris, in different contexts, then our 
corresponding partial identities could be univocally linked from a technical perspective.48 
This is possible because our iris is so discriminatory that it distinguishes us from the rest of 
mankind. 
                                                 
46 Typically, a good strategy would be to reveal only what is strictly necessary in such a context. 
47 Cf. M. Hansen, “User-controlled identity management: The future of privacy”, in Jaquet-Chiffelle et 
al. 2006. 
48 Of course, this depends on the interoperability of the possibly distinct implementations of all these 
applications. Note that we consider here only the technical feasibility, not the real likelihood. 
Figure 1. Identities and partial identities  
Source: tutorial of the PRIME (Privacy and Identity Management for Europe) project, 
available at http://www.prime-project.eu/.  
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4.1.1.3 Data protection and revocability 
Another drawback of current iris recognition technology is related to data protection. 
Biometric templates that specify our iris structure patterns are vulnerable data. Unlike DNA, 
they do not reveal information about our genetic predispositions or, contrary to the belief of 
iridology,49 our health status.50 However, if they are stolen, their owner has currently no 
choice but to revoke them (when possible) to avoid future fraudulent use. In doing so, he loses 
all advantages linked to this biometric in terms of convenience and security. In general, 
‘[t]here is the additional risk with biometrics that whereas other pseudonyms can be replaced 
from time to time which can make linkage more difficult, biometric ones are inherently 
associated with a physical person (thus cannot be changed) and once compromised can never 
be anonymised.’51 
We can change password as many times as desired, but most people have only two irises and 
ten fingerprints. Once we have revoked both our irises, we are unable to use iris recognition 
anymore. It does not matter whether biometric templates are kept in a common database52 or 
on separate smart cards.53 Of course, local storage is preferable to centralized storage from a 
privacy point of view. But in both cases, sensitive personal data is stored somewhere and 
subject to theft.  
Regardless, biometrics remain an attractive process due to its many advantages. So how can 
we turn for example iris recognition from a privacy-invasive technology (PIT) to a privacy-
enhancing technology (PET)? Our solution based on pseudonyms solves all the above-
mentioned problems. 
4.1.1.4 Biometric pseudonyms 
Etymologically speaking, a pseudonym is a ‘false name’ or an alias. For example, authors 
may use one or several pen names instead of their real name. However, a given pen name 
plays the role of a mask for its subjects54. The virtual person ‘Ann Onymous’ may be used by 
one physical person or shared by many different persons, or it could conceal a computer 
program. 
The concept of biometric pseudonym takes back the idea of multiple aliases but it creates a 
strong link between the owner of some biometric trait and her pseudonyms. Thus, we can be 
confident that only one single physical person hides behind any biometric pseudonym. For 
instance, a particular iris may be linked to many pseudonyms but no biometric pseudonym 
                                                 
49 Cf. the definition from Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iridology: “Iridology (also known as 
iridodiagnosis) is an alternative medicine technique whose proponents believe that patterns, colors, 
and other characteristics of the iris can be examined to determine information about a patient's 
systemic health. Practitioners match their observations to iris charts which divide the iris into zones 
which they correspond to specific parts of the human body” . But note also: “Iridology is not 
supported by any published studies and is considered pseudoscience to most medical practitioners” 
(ibid.).  
50 For a detailed discussion see Kindt & Müller 2007. 
51 Michison et al. 2004.  
52 Take for instance the screening database (watch list) of persona non grata on the territory of the 
United Arab Emirates. 
53 Like those of the eye-scan program for frequent flyers at JFK airport. 
54 See Jaquet-Chiffelle et al. 2006. 
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can be related to two physical persons. As enumerated in the previous section, iris biometric 
pseudonyms have to: 
• Store no sensitive biometric data. We achieve this by using a one-way function for the 
computation of pseudonyms from the original template. 
• Be as numerous as desired. Once we know how to produce one pseudonym, the process 
can easily be extended to create many distinct instances by the addition of a parameter. To 
each pseudonym, we associate a value such as a PIN or a service-dependent number.  
• Be unlinkable to each other. There is no direct link between two pseudonyms of the same 
person: the only existing link is through the original iris. This is made possible by the 
parameterized one-way function, which means that brute force is the only possible attack, 
under the assumption that the one-way function is strong from a cryptographic 
perspective. 
• Be revocable. As biometric pseudonyms are non-sensitive data, they can be simply 
revoked by adding them to a black list. A new pseudonym can then easily be constructed 
using a different parameter (e.g. a different PIN). 
Note that these four points are just fully compatible with the three points of the EU project 
TURBINE mentioned above. 
As shown in Figure 2 , there are one-way links from a person’s templates to its pseudonyms. 
The main difficulty is that, due to the imaging process, the same iris (and similarly all other 
biometrics) yields a different template every time (we have drawn three of them in Figure 2). 
In spite of this intra-class variation, we want to get constant pseudonyms. This is the big 
challenge. 
On the other side, the interclass variation, i.e. the variation of pseudonyms which belong to 
different human iris, must be large enough to be separated from the intra-class variation 
mentioned above.  
4.1.2 BioCrypt – Biometric Pseudonyms in the Example of Iris Data 
The general processing steps of a biometric system have extensively been described for 
example in FIDIS deliverable D3.10 – see Figure 3.  
Figure 2. Biometric pseudonyms  
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In the following section, we will have a look at the image acquisition, i.e., how the physical 
appearance of the human (or other biometrically measurable entity) is done, followed by the 
template production and analysis, template matching as has been studied in the BioCrypt 
project (http://labs.hti.bfh.ch/biocrypt). We present the ideas only as a brief overview. The 
interested reader will find more information and additional links on the website mentioned. 
4.1.2.1 Image Acquisition 
In the process of image acquisition, there is no difference to the ‘standard’ approach, i.e., in 
fact all we need is an image of the iris, in a quite good quality, mostly done in near infra-red 
illumination 650-900 nm band. In our approach, we restricted ourselves to the use of available 
databases of iris images in order to avoid the administrative and technical problems of live 
image acquisition.  
4.1.2.2 Template Production and Analysis 
As in the ‘standard’ approach, we have to  
• localize the iris ring within the eye, i.e. find the pupil and the outer limit of the iris,  
• stretch the resulting image into a rectangle of normalized size which is done by 
transformation of polar coordinated into polar ones, 
• apply 2D Gabor wavelets transform to extract the biometric features.55 
An example with these three steps is shown in the next figure. 
                                                 
55 See the project BioCrypt, http://labs.hti.bfh.ch/biocrypt, for a more detailed description.  
Figure 3. Overview of steps for a biometric system. Source: Kindt & Müller 2007.  
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The challenge in this process is the determination of the valid parts of the image, i.e. the parts 
that really contain information about the iris and not the surrounding parts like parts of the 
eyelid or eyelashes. In actual live image acquisition, this problem can to some extent be eased 
by repeating the process until an image (or several) of acceptable quality is available. 
However in many cases no ‘perfect’ image of the iris is available and the further processing 
must be capable of dealing with invalid portions of the image. The simplest idea clearly is to 
consider only the intersection of the valid parts of the templates, yet one has to pay attention 
that enough information persists in this intersection. 
Here, we do not distinguish between the enrolment phase and the recognition phase (cf. also 
Figure 3, where the paths in the figure are identical up to the template production). The 
typical difference between the two phases is only in the quality and eventually the number of 
the images taken, which is of minor interest here. 
4.1.2.3 Template matching (verification vs. identification) 
In verification, there are two (or more) templates available, and the algorithm determines 
whether the templates match or not. In identification, we look for the one template in a set of 
templates which matches best the template provided. In both cases, there is a matching 
algorithm which must compute distances between pairs of templates. Here for the discussion 
of our approach, we do not distinguish between verification and identification because all we 
are interested in for the moment is the matching algorithm.  
Such a matching algorithm can clearly not test on equality of the templates only because 
different influences (from the environment) may augment the variation of the image of the 
iris, like different equipment (camera), rotation of the iris, eyes more or less closed (hence 
different validity zones), etc. Typically, the Hamming distance is used for computing the 
bitwise difference of two templates, but this is clearly dependant on the size, position and 
rotation of the iris.56 In the simplest case, rotation can to some extent be circumvented by 
                                                 
56 For a general discussion of how to recognize irises of different sizes, positions or orientations, see 
Daugman 2004. 
Figure 4: Template production 
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adding some shifting to the templates. 
4.1.2.4 Iris biometric pseudonyms 
Consider a simple pseudonymization algorithm first. As mentioned, iris recognition relies on 
a measure of similarity derived from the Hamming distance. Two biometric templates are 
claimed to describe the same iris if their Hamming distance is sufficiently small, i.e. if they 
are similar enough.  
Now let us consider a simple algorithm for pseudonyms generation involving the SHA-25657 
hash function. Instead of storing whole templates, we save only 256 bit hash codes. We can 
create as many pseudonyms as needed by appending some parameter, like a PIN, to a 
template before hashing it.58 
This promising algorithm enables both pseudonymization and privacy protection. Yet, we 
have two problems to solve: 
• Due to the avalanche effect, if one bit of the input flips, about half of the output bits flip. 
This means that, in order to obtain the same hash code, we should have absolutely 
identical templates, which is practically never the case. We have to find a prior 
transformation that turns same-class instances into a unique class archetype.  
• We have to deal with the varying proportion and location of valid biometric data inside a 
template. Invalid areas cannot be compared or equated to valid information. Therefore, 
instead of replacing the Hamming distance similarity measure with a single equality 
check, we suggest to run multiple equality tests on various valid parts of the template.  
For dealing with the first problem, we focus on error-correcting codes (ECC) which are 
designed to deal with the errors that can happen during the transmission or storage of data. 
Their basic idea is to add redundancy to data before sending it over a communications 
channel or saving it on a storage medium.  
When the data is subsequently received or read, it is possible to detect whether some errors 
have occurred or not. In the case of transmission, the receiver can either restore the original 
message by correcting these errors or request the transmitter to resend the data. 
In the case of storage, a simple example would be the tenth and last digit of the ISBN-10 
number which is computed from the first nine digits. This check digit enables detection when 
a symbol has been altered or two adjacent symbols have been inverted; strictly speaking this 
is an error-detecting code which can only detect but not correct the error(s). Likewise, 
redundancy checks can be performed through parity bits, checksums or CRCs. 
Error-correcting codes have numerous applications for storage on high density media (e.g. 
CDs, DVDs), and communication over noisy channels or with limited power resources (e.g. 
GSM, space probe). Note that their performances are restricted: errors of some type can 
always be corrected while other errors can only be detected. Finally, a third kind of errors 
cannot be detected at all. 
                                                 
57 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA1. Note that in principle, any reliable hash function can be 
considered for this application. 
58 Similarly, this can be done using Message Authentication Codes MAC, see http://de.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Message_Authentication_Code.  
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So here in the context of biometric pseudonyms, we have the problem caused by intra-class 
variation, also called biometric fuzziness: how can we extract a constant string out of the 
variable template of a given iris? On the other hand, the problem of error correction is to find 
back a codeword by removing the noise that has affected it.  
The fundamental idea of applying ECC to biometrics is that these two problems are similar. 
Instead of developing a new technique to solve the first problem, we choose to reuse the 
solution to the second one. However, this solution needs to be slightly adapted. 
We can see ECC decoding as a kind of geometric projection in a discrete space whose points 
are the strings of some length. The codewords of a given code are a subset of these points. 
Each codeword has its own decoding region which contains all the points that are always 
decoded as – projected onto – this codeword. In the case of nearest neighbor decoding, the 
decoding regions are centered at their respective codeword. 
Thus, decoding a so-called received word consists in finding what decoding region contains it 
and projecting onto its center codeword. The received word is always accurately corrected if 
the codeword is affected by an error of weight smaller than half the minimum distance 
between distinct codewords. 
Traditional ECC decoding works because any sent word is a codeword and is therefore at the 
center of a decoding region. Now what happens if we try to decode biometric data? The result 
will be unsatisfactory because sent words will not necessarily be codewords anymore. For this 
reason, the decoding process must be adapted.  
Each time we measure a biometric trait, we get a different template. The collection of all 
possible templates for a given iris can be viewed as a cluster of points whose center is a 
random point in some space. The problem is that the cluster points are spread in different 
decoding regions. This means that they will be decoded as different values, whereas we want 
to get always – or, at least, most of the time – the same value for a given class. 
If we could find the cluster center, we could perform a simple translation in order to center the 
cluster around some codeword. But as we know only a few points of the cluster at the time of 
enrolment, we can merely compute an imprecise estimate of the cluster center. Yet, we have 
no other option.59  
For application to biometrics, a further question is then which ECC should be chosen? 
Different requirements from its application to biometrics, like the code, length, dimension, 
distance, transmission rate and especially the error correcting rate impose that the ‘right’ ECC 
is a matter of compromise.  
For the second problem mentioned above, namely that we have to deal with the varying 
proportion and location of valid biometric data inside a template, we no longer use the whole 
template as is, but zones selected from it. We call zones the portions of biometric data used 
for the recognition of iris templates. For convenience, we decide to use rectangular shapes 
within the (horizontally) circular template domain. Zones can loop horizontally, but not 
vertically, inside the stretched iris ring. A zone is hence a (non empty) rectangle in the 
template space. Figure 5 below shows the template domain and two zones (A, B) along with 
the definition of the axes and the zone parameters. Notice the location of zone B which loops 
horizontally. These zones will be the regions of interest instead of considering the whole 
                                                 
59 See the project BioCrypt, http://labs.hti.bfh.ch/biocrypt, for a more detailed description. 
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Figure 5. Template domain 
A major question, then, is which zones should be considered and how to compare different 
templates using these zones. Without getting into too much detail, all we do is select a 
(sufficiently big) number of zones of ‘good’ size in the enrolment phase and compare them 
then in the verification phase with zones of same size in the presented template. This is to be 
combined with the process of using error-correcting codes mentioned above. Clearly, this 
induces some computational overhead, which can be limited to a reasonable extent in an 
acceptable way. 
So finally, all that needs to be stored for each enrolment is a set of data items which are the 
result of zones of the templates having been first processed using error-correcting codes, then 
combined with some PIN and finally hashed. The combination of these techniques allows to 
satisfy all requirements we have mentioned above, hence biometric pseudonyms are available. 
4.1.3 Conclusion 
The presented approaches do not solve all problems of biometrics, but address especially the 
concerns raised in FIDIS deliverable D3.10: Biometrics in identity management, how templ-
ates ‘could be rendered unique by encryption in such way that if the (uniquely) encrypted bio-
metric template is stolen, it could be rendered useless (much like revocation of a PIN).’60 The 
presented approach using error-correcting codes together with zones of templates is one poss-
ibility for successfully providing this, as our a proof of concept implementation has shown.  
To our knowledge, there is no commercial product implementing privacy-enhancing iris 
recognition. But two companies offer similar products based on fingerprints: Philips priv-
ID61, and GenKey62 that coined the term ‘biocryptics’. The solution made by priv-ID creates 
anonymous and revocable biometric identifiers that can be e.g. printed as barcodes or stored 
in RFID chips, which implies a verification scenario. Further, as already mentioned, the EU 
project TURBINE focuses on fingerprints as well.  
                                                 
60 Kindt & Müller 2007. 
61 http://www.priv-id.com/.  
62 http://www.genkey.no/.  
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4.2 Organizational and technical decisions: Privacy Impact 
Assessment 
4.2.1 Introduction 
For the evaluation of the impact of biometrics on privacy and data protection internationally 
two methods are established:  
1. the Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) and  
2. a Data Protection compliance check.  
Both methods result in a list of suggested or required technical and organizational measures. 
In this chapter the lists resulting from the application of both methods will be compared. The 
result of this comparison is of interest especially for vendors that have an interest to sale a 
biometric system on the international market. 
4.2.2 Privacy vs. data protection 
First of all when comparing different methods one needs to clarify their targets. The term 
‘privacy’ is referring to at least four different types of privacy:63 
• information privacy referring to the way private or governmental institutions handle 
Personal Identifiable Information (PII),64 
• privacy of communications including e.g. the privacy of correspondence, 
• physical or bodily privacy referring to the way under which conditions and how a body 
search may be carried out or body samples (e.g. DNA) may be used, and 
• privacy of personal behavior referring to the freedom of action as long as freedoms of 
others are not touched or restricted.  
Data Protection is focused on the protection of personal data, a concept defined in Art. 2(a) of 
the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC65 and recently further clarified by the Art. 29 Data 
Protection Working Party in the Working Paper 136.66 In short, there is not much difference 
between the concepts of PII and personal data. European data protection legislation is focused 
on information privacy and partly covers privacy of communications.  
As in the context of this study the European perspective is of most interest, we will focus on 
the types of privacy mapping with the targets of the European Data Protection legislation. 
4.2.3 PIA – Background and Methodology 
The PIA is a formalized privacy risk assessment method that was developed in the mid-1990s. 
Early descriptions of the method and guidelines for its application date back to 1998.67 Since 
the early 2000s the method is adapted by the authorities responsible for privacy protection (in 
                                                 
63 See e.g. the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act of 1998 from the state of New South 
Wales in Australia, http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/privacynsw/ll_pnsw.nsf/pages/ 
pnsw_03_ppipact.  
64 In this context Personal Identifiable Information (PII) is understood as defined in the OECD 
Guidelines on Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data from 1980, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
65 Accessible via http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/index_en.htm. 
66 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf. 
67 Clarke 1998.  
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many cases the Privacy Commissioners) in a number of countries, among them Australia68, 
Canada69, New Zealand70 and the United States71. Typically the national implementations of 
PIA come along with a guideline or handbook, referring especially to the national privacy 
protection legislation and varying in concreteness with regard to the privacy risks to be 
covered. One of the most detailed descriptions and guidelines for the application of the 
methodology is provided by the Federal Privacy Commissioner of Australia.72 The description 
of PIA in the following section is based on the Australian guideline. 
All handbooks and guidelines investigated agree in the phase of the life cycle of procedures 
and products (plan, build, run or operate) the PIA best is applied: The application in the 
planning phase is recommended in general.  
4.2.3.1 PIA – Description of the methodology 
The PIA results in a privacy impact report, a document that can be compared in its structure 
with a security concept. In this report the results of the steps one needs to run through in the 
context of PIA are documented. In this way the reports show always the same structure. The 
five steps to be documented are: 
1. Project description (description of governmental and business procedures including the 
ICT used); 
2. Mapping the information flow (description of the data flows focused on PII); 
3. Privacy impact analysis (core step, documenting the results of the privacy risk 
assessment); 
4. Privacy management (analysis whether the procedures from a privacy point of view could 
be improved); 
5. Recommendations (list with technical and organizational privacy protection measures). 
For the core step 3 a standardized questionnaire is provided. It includes a list of relevant 
privacy risk related and explained questions:73 
• Is compliance to privacy legislation given? 
• Do individuals have to give up control of information about themselves to any degree?  
• Will the project require, or is it likely to result in, individuals changing their behavior 
(e.g., having to present identification in more circumstances), or incurring costs?  
• Will the project impact disproportionately on individuals or groups without identity 
documentation?  
• Will decisions that have consequences for individuals be made on the basis of the personal 
information handled in the project (e.g., decisions about services or benefits)?  
• Does the project deliver the right amount of accurate and relevant information to 
adequately inform these decisions?  
                                                 
68 See e.g. http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/pia06/mod-f.html and 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/DEPARTMENT/atip/pia.asp. 
69 See e.g. http://www.privcom.gc.ca/pia-efvp/index_e.asp. 
70 See e.g. http://www.privacy.org.nz/privacy-impact-assessment-handbook/. 
71 See e.g. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_eisntein.pdf. 
72 See http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/pia06/index.html. 
73 Cf. http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/pia06/mod-f.html and 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/DEPARTMENT/atip/pia.asp. 

Future of Identity in the Information Society (No. 507512) 
D3.16 
 




• Is there provision for complaint-handling mechanisms, in the event that privacy breaches 
eventuate?  
• Have emergency procedures been devised in the event that the system fails?  
• Is there provision for audit and oversight mechanisms, including emergency procedures in 
the event that the system fails?  
• Does the project include the potential for function creep (e.g., might there be an interest in 
using the personal information collected for the project, for other purposes) or other 
unplanned consequences?  
• Assess the value of the information to unauthorized users (e.g., is it information that 
others would pay money or expend effort to gain access to)?  
• Is any intrusion (physical or on property) or surveillance (whether covert or overt) fully 
justified and proportional to the outcome?  
• Is it the only way of achieving the aims of the project?  
• Is it done in the least intrusive manner?  
• Is it subject to legislative or judicial authority?  
• How consistent is the project with community values about privacy (e.g., does it involve 
new ways of identifying individuals, the creation of significant databases or the use of 
genetic material or information)?  
• How has privacy been factored in the project’s cost-benefit analysis, and the analysis of 
the project’s return on investment?  
The PIA is generally applicable within as well as outside Europe – the first question in the 
privacy risk assessment provides the connection to national or regional legal requirements. 
This may include European data protection legislation. Differences in legal regime concerning 
data or privacy protection, for example the sectoral approach of privacy protection legislation 
outside Europe vs. a broad applicability of data protection legislation in Europe can be 
addressed by PIA this way. 
4.2.3.2 Application of PIA in the context of biometrics 
Since the late 1990s and early 2000s PIA has been applied to biometrics by various authors, 
among them the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Dr. Ann Cavoukian,74 the 
Federal Privacy Commissioner of Australia, Malcolm Crompton,75 Roger Clarke,76 and 
consultancy companies.77 Recent updates concerning the results of the privacy risk 
assessment, especially recommendations, are available.78 
The recommendations by the authors for a privacy aware or privacy compliant application 
show a certain variety, as the evaluation of the same set of risks leads to different conclusions. 
This has quite a number of reasons of which the following seem to be the most important: 
• Differences in the legal grounds concerning privacy protection. 
• Differences in the results of the evaluation for different biometric methods such as 
fingerprint recognition, face recognition or genetic fingerprinting. 
                                                 
74 See Cavoukian 1999b. 
75 See http://www.privacy.gov.au/news/speeches/sp80notes.doc. 
76 See http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/Biometrics.html. 
77 See for example the International Biometrics Groupe, LLC, New York, with the BioPrivacy 
Initiative, a PIA based consultancy approach, http://www.bioprivacy.org/. 
78 See e.g. Cavoukian & Stoianov 2007 and Curtis 2006.  
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• Progress in research concerning threats and vulnerabilities of biometric systems as well as 
progress in privacy protection measures. 
4.2.4 Comparison of PIA with a Data Protection Compliance Check 
As already explained the recommendations resulting from the application of PIA show a 
certain variety. This is also true for the results of the data protection compliance check. In 
addition to the reasons mentioned for PIA, considerations concerning proportionality are 
important.79 A comprehensive comparison on the recommendations level would lead to highly 
case-specific results. However, a more general comparison concerning the coverage of both 
methods concerning specific privacy / data protection risks can be carried out relatively easy, 
based on the references cited above in section 4.2.3.2. In addition, selected, mostly general 
and not case-specific recommendations are used to make the comparison more concrete. 
Concerning data protection compliance, the recommendations are taken from various 
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79 See e.g. Müller & Kindt 2009.  
80 Gasson et al. 2005; Kindt 2007; Meints 2007; the Working Paper 80 of the the Art. 29 Data 
Protection Working Party (http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/ 
wp80_en.pdf); and the WhitePaper Datenschutz in der Biometrie issued by TeleTrust e.V. 
(http://www.teletrust.org/uploads/media/Datenschutz-in-der-Biometrie-080521.pdf).  
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81 BioPrivacy Application Impact Framework, accessible via http://www.bioprivacy.org/. 
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82 BioPrivacy Application Impact Framework, accessible via http://www.bioprivacy.org/. 
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83 See e.g. https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/guetesiegel/index.htm. 
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Table 4. Comparison of PIA with a Data Protection Compliance Check 
 
4.2.5 Summary and conclusion 
The result of the comparison between PIA and a data protection compliance check shows that 
there are not many differences in the resulting general recommendations or requirements 
concerning privacy and data protection of biometric systems.  
Data protection provides a binding legal framework for the application of biometric systems 
where data protection legislation is applicable. Flexible evaluations are possible based on 
proportionality considerations. 
PIA uses a qualitative privacy risk assessment method that is similar to the qualitative method 
for information security risk assessment described in ISO/IEC 27005. The privacy risks to be 
covered can be described in standardized questionnaires, covering relevant classes of privacy 
risks. PIA covers a larger area of risks for individuals, as certain aspects of privacy in 
communication, bodily privacy and behavioral privacy are not covered by data protection 
legislation. Flexible evaluations are possible by assessing the possible impact and the 
likeliness of occurrence of a privacy incident for specific application scenarios of biometric 
systems. Recommendations generated using PIA are binding only in cases where legal 
grounds require the implementation of privacy protecting technical and organizational 
measures.  
PIA can be used to include European data protection legislation in the compliance 
requirements. A qualitative risk assessment using PIA may also generate indications 
concerning proportionality considerations in the context of a data protection compliance 
check.  
In any case, a PIA carried out for a specific application scenario of biometric systems 
provides a valuable ground for a data protection compliance check in European member 
countries. However, to comply with European data protection legislation, specific and mainly 
organizational requirements such as prior checking, reporting requirements etc. need to be 
taken into consideration in addition. That PIA assesses a larger area of risks for individuals 
not covered by European data protection legislation may result in various welcome additional 
recommendations, even if are as a matter of course these are not based on binding rules.  
                                                                                                                                                        
84 See http://www.european-privacy-seal.eu/. 
85 Available via http://www.bioprivacy.org/. 
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5 Testing-stage decisions 
5.1 Centre Link voice recognition  
Centre Link conducts a pilot project aimed at testing replacing the client number and 
password system with a voice recognition system. Centrelink is an Australian Government 
agency within the Human Services portfolio that offers services such as job search assistance, 
childcare and social security benefits including unemployment payments, pensions and family 
assistance packages, whereas it oversees international pension payments.86 This agency offers 
its services to more than 8 million customers. Access to Centrelink is provided through: 
• 401 Centrelink offices around Australia; 
• a Web site, which currently processes 1.6 million enquiries a year; 
• a central call center, which receives approximately 28 million calls a year; 
• mobile and remote-link services based in rural areas and the regions, including social 
workers, farm support and financial information. 
The demand on Centrelink call centers has been increasing over the past years, posing a strict 
need for new measures to be taken for the reduction of the call waiting of citizens as well as 
demand on front counter staff and improve the quality of services offered, including fast and 
convenient access to Centrelink services. Moreover, given the nature of the services provided, 
identity and authentication comprise critical issues. Towards this direction Centrelink 
introduced the Interactive Voice Recognition (IVR) phone services. 
Centrelink has been investigating the incorporation of voice authentication since 2002, but 
was quite reluctant to introduce this technology into their systems due to its immaturity, its 
non-readiness for large-scale deployment and the great effort required to enable the handling 
of the agency’s strict security protocols. However, given the recent advancements in the 
biometric technologies and voice authentication techniques in particular and after a long close 
cooperation with the telecommunications provider Telstra, it has developed a voice 
authentication system which will be used for the authentication of the Centrelink customers 
over the phone via their voiceprint, replacing this way the client number and password. 
Currently this system is on active trial including 10 Centrelink employees in order to evaluate 
and ensure its stability, robustness and performance according to the system requirements. 
However, the agency is planning to extend the trials involving general public for larger-scale 
evaluation and more accurate refinement. 
This speaker verification system is built for semi-complex two-factor authentication (to 
Australian Government Authentication Framework standards).87 Based on this system the 
user is requested to answer to one or two pre-recorded secrets in order to offer to them access 
to the system and their account. Thus, every customer must have her identity verified through 
the voice authentication system before being granted with the permission to access her 
personal accounts. Through the Centrelink services every two weeks 200,000 customers 
provide their earnings mainly through the communication with a live operator. The 
incorporation of voice authentication into the Centrelink system aims at improving the 
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workload management within the system by offering faster customer serving. However, it 
should be noted that the incorporation of speaker verification functionalities into the 
Centrelink system mainly focuses on the enhancement of the security aspects of the system 
(authentication) and not of the user interface. 
5.2 ABN AMRO voice recognition 
Voice verification in telephone banking was selected by the ABN AMRO bank as one of its 
areas of investment and development in the early 2000s. For ABN AMRO, the proposed use 
of voice verification was one development in a wider strategy to use speech technology in the 
provision of bank services.88 The biometric application falls under Type IV: Convenience 
model. It is a combination of the data subject solely taking the decision to use biometrics for 
exclusive private convenience purposes (easy banking when there is an alternative available) 
(Type IVa) and the ABN AMRO bank using biometrics for simplification and increased 
security of an administrative process with central or divided control (Type IVb and IVc).  
The ABN AMRO bank carried out an extensive telephone pilot to assess whether voice 
recognition was a worth while alternative for TIN code (Telephone Identification Number) in 
a stand alone system with more than 1300 (employee) participants and over 30.000 calls.89 
This project was technically very successful and as competitors were not at all in a position to 
introduce voice recognition within the near future, so the bank seemed on course to gain ‘a 
first mover competitor advantage’.90 
Nevertheless, the project was put on hold in 2008 after a takeover by Fortis, Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Banco Santander. Official statements stated that a changing company strategy 
and a wider need of re-assessment of the cost of the overall project portfolio formed the 
background to this decision. The decision had nothing to do with a re-assessment of the 
benefits and advantages of the project. From the documents available it becomes clear that the 
take over has probably only caused a serious delay in the full roll out of a system using 
biometrics. The bank is still aiming for an optimal use of different speech (including voice) 
technologies in bank services. This is explained as follows: like iris recognition, voice 
recognition is less likely to be used for other (e.g. forensic) purposes than the application in 
hand. In trials, an equal error rate of below 1% has been achieved, exceeding security and 
performance criteria, even without the additional security of a second factor such as a security 
question. In addition, from an end user point of view, speech is an intuitive and natural 
technology. The bank was attracted to the notion that voice or speech recognition only uses 
spoken words, and it is generally regarded less intrusive than systems that rely on scanners or 
other devices. Despite considerable costs, the system chosen would also allow for alternative 
arrangements, leaving the choice whether or not to participate in voice recognition to the 
individual bank customer. Therefore, the voice recognition fitted into the bank’s wider 
strategy to been seen to generate and maintain high levels of customer trust and protection of 
customer privacy. 
Analyzing the factors that played a role in the decision whether or not to proceed with voice 
                                                 
88 For example, the bank uses another form of speech technology: the use of speech navigation in 
customers’ telephone contact with the bank (replacing complicated touch-tone menus).  
89 For details, see http://www.findbiometrics.com/Pages/voice%20articles/vvabn.pdf. 
90 For the factors determining the choice for voice recognition and the full strategy and short, medium 
and long-term outlook of the bank, see Frost & Sullivan 2006. 
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recognition in the magic triangle scheme: 
• The project scored high on quality and convenience and the cost factor seem not to 
prevent the project from becoming fully operational. The privacy and security advantages 
of voice recognition were regarded as being so high, that no alternative biometric 
applications were regarded a viable alternative.  
• Then after the takeover, the cost of the project suddenly halted the project for the time 
being, despite the fact that the quality and convenience factors both scored high. 
In conclusion, this case study about the decision-making process regarding the use of an 
biometric application in a commercial environment provides some interesting data. If we were 
to ask the question whether organizations have some inherent interest in privacy, we find a 
few answers here. Drivers to protect privacy can be found, for example, in fear of reputational 
damage and increased business awareness of the strong link between protecting privacy and 
protecting security. Another driver to protect privacy in this case study is clearly the need to 
generate trust with (potential) customers and to show good corporate practice as being an 
innovative and modern bank. In the short term, privacy considerations may have been given 
so much weight, that, due to the changing circumstances at the bank, the chosen system 
invested in could not be put into operation. Cheaper, less privacy enhancing solutions, 
probably also carrying higher security risks, were not adopted as viable alternatives. The 
choice to allow other forms of telebanking to continue (voluntary nature of the application), 
the choice of biometric (voice), opting for multi-factor system use (two-factor authentication), 
insistence on data quality investment (expensive procedure to make sure that enrollment 
quality was maximal) and even the very limited options to use the biometric data for profiling, 
all added to the cost of the voice recognition application. All in all, this resulted in the roll-out 
of voice recognition being put on ice. 
5.3 The ePass 
Privacy and security features of the German ePass have been discussed in previous FIDIS 
deliverables. D3.6: Study on ID Documents91 contains a study with focus on the 
recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)92 and on the first 
generation of security features of the ePass, such as Basic Access Control (BAC). The 
deliverable particularly outlines threats of tracking citizens by means of weak authentication, 
static IDs, and passive biometrics. It also outlines threats of data leakage because of an 
inappropriate choice of key parameters for encryption and thus for confidentiality. 
Measures for mitigating these shortcomings have been proposed in part in the ICAO 
recommendations, for instance Faraday cages to suppress unwitting communication, but have 
not or rarely been adapted by identity document issuers. 
D3.10: Biometrics in identity management93 complements the study by an analysis focused on 
biometrics and security features of the second generation, such as Extended Access Control 
(EAC). The deliverable particularly outlines threats arising from biometrics stored in central 
databases and summarizes alternative solutions, such as template-based authentication where 
the actual biometric data is (stored or acquired and) evaluated on a trusted device, such as a 
                                                 
91 Meints & Hansen 2006.  
92 See http://www.icao.int/. 
93 Kindt & Müller 2007.  

Future of Identity in the Information Society (No. 507512) 
D3.16 
 




smart card. Deliverable D3.10 also refers to biometrics as a measure to ensure privacy when 
used in an authorization framework. This, however, requires that authorization by means of 
biometrics can be done without raising new privacy threats just from using biometrics. In 
most cases, this requirement is not fulfilled. 
In addition, with the Budapest Declaration on Machine Readable Travel Documents 
(MRTDs), the FIDIS network released a review of the ICAO recommendations for MRTDs.94 
The ICAO recommendations have been adapted to electronic ID documents in the EU. The 
Budapest declaration contains a set of recommendations for short-term, mid-term, and long-
term actions to be taken in order to improve MRTDs in the future. These recommendations 
most prominently include the limitation of the purpose to borderline control. 
Electronic ID documents (or MRTDs) are more and more entering into the live of European 
citizens. The German government recently decided to introduce electronic identity cards 
starting from 2010.95 It will contain a set of biometric images and templates, similar to the 
European passport.96 In contrast to the recommendations in the Budapest declarations, the 
electronic identity card will not be limited to the purpose of borderline control, but 
deliberately open to a range of purposes; explicitly mentioned are eGovernment and 
eBusiness.97 
At the same time, the current security measures such as BAC and EAC are better understood 
due to formal verification,98 and new security measures are proposed and implemented99 in 
order to overcome the weaknesses discovered in the current protocols. A comprehensive 
security analysis of these new protocols will be subject of future research. 
In this case study, we will abstain from repeating the work in the previous deliverables and 
instead briefly survey recent work that appeared since 2008, i.e., since Deliverable D3.10 was 
published. We summaries findings about formal security analysis, recent protocols 
developments for new documents such as the German identity card, and their security 
evaluation. 
5.3.1 Terrorist detection and the change in identity documents 
The motivation for introducing MRTDs can be understood as the approach to address the gaps 
in current border control procedures that were made obvious during recent terrorist attacks. 
Apart from the question of whether expectations to secure the authentication by means of 
biometrics can be satisfied or not, a change in border control procedures has been performed. 
While the threats arising from the introduction of MRTDs have been recognized in scientific 
publications as well as in public media, the nature of the change is often blurred in the 
arguments. 
                                                 
94 FIDIS, Budapest Declaration on Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs), Future of Identity 
in the Information Society, 2006, available at http://www.fidis.net; ICAO 2008.  
95 Gesetzesbeschluss des Deutschen Bundestages: Gesetz über Personalausweise und 
denelektronischen Identitätsnachweis sowie zur Änderung weiterer Vorschriften. Deutscher 
Bundestag, Drucksache 32/09 vom 23.01.2009, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/brd/2009/0032-
09.pdf.  
96 Reisen 2008.  
97 Bender et al. 2008; Reisen 2008.  
98 Pasupathinathan et al. 2008a.  
99 Bender et al. 2008.  
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Koc-Menard analyzes the nature of the change and identifies three trends: 
1. ‘a move away from evidence-based detection to rule-based discovery’ 
2. ‘a move away from observation of actual human behavior to the analysis of electronic 
traits’, and  
3. ‘a move away from national discovery systems to multinational structures.’100 
The first trend is the reason for building up of large knowledge bases, from which indicators 
of terrorist activity can be derived. Then, instead of interpreting actually committed activities 
of citizens, the indicators are matched against personal data in order to quantify the threat that 
is arising from the data subject. Rule-based detection systems, however, have a serious 
drawback, they may fail with false positives and false negatives. This can be compared with a 
human that is guessing and improves by time and observation. The systems need to learn from 
their mistakes as well to improve the rules, i.e., making the rules match the reality better. 
However, rule-based systems will never reach the perfect set of rules, since the reality 
dynamically changes over time and the systems, thus, need to adapt all the time. 
The second trend makes it necessary to make as much personal information electronically 
available as possible. The identity is not longer determined by what you are, but rather by 
what you show. This raises the question of how easy it would be to show a different identity, 
pretend to be someone else, and thus the entire question of identity fraud. For automatic 
detection of terrorists, people need to be stuck to their identities. That is why biometrics is 
included in modern MRTDs. 
The third trend most nobly supports the interconnection and collaboration in terror prevention 
across countries and beyond political borders. The back side of the medal is, however, that 
this is a fail-safe way to implicitly trade legislation whenever not explicitly regulated, for 
instance all those countries that do not definitely export their data protection regulations will 
implicitly import a mixture of the most liberal regulations of the other countries. At the end of 
his analysis of the current trends, Koc-Menard raises the question whether rule-based terror 
prevention systems would be the end of privacy. He concludes that this is not the case, since it 
would be possible as well to apply rule-based terror prevention to small sets of personal data 
and good guesses, just as it currently is with the human-driven border controls. The challenge 
would be to find a set of appropriate size and meaning. 
5.3.2 Formal Analysis of MRTD Security Measures 
Pasupathinathan et al. have published a formal security analysis of BAC, ActiveAuth-
entication (AA), and EAC.101 As to BAC, the result is (not surprisingly) a formal verification 
of known shortcomings. In particular, the man-in-the-middle attack was successfully verified 
by means of model checking. The AA protocol, in contrast, works perfectly as expected and 
secure, but only as long as BAC can be assumed to work securely. The model checker shows 
that AA can be compromised, once the weakness against replay attacks of BAC is exploited. 
Then, an attacker can gain possession of the session key and decrypt the transferred data. 
Besides, an attacker would be able to authenticate to the reader as a genuine passport. By 
combining the weaknesses of both, BAC and AA, it is even possible to create a copy of the 
                                                 
100 Koc-Menard 2009.  
101 Pasupathinathan et al. 2008a. 
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passport. This would indeed be a considerable step towards identity fraud. It is also possible, 
to masquerade as a genuine reader by exploiting the knowledge of the session keys. This way, 
it is possible to make the chip authenticate an arbitrary reader. Pasupathinathan et al. also 
point out that random nonces are necessary for the BAC and AA to work properly. Nonces 
without enough entropy102 enable the attacker to perform cipher-text with known partial plain-
text attacks. In the long run, that might lead to the disclosure of the session key. This is 
particularly an issue, since key freshness and key integrity cannot be assured (as outlined in 
the previous paragraph) and MRTDs use to have a relatively long validity compared to the 
time frame in which the attacks can be performed. In addition, it is not very likely that a 
device of so limited resources like an RFID chip may be capable of generating high-quality 
nonces. Thus, the reader might be the only source of appropriate entropy, whereas the reader 
is not authenticated and thus not a trustworthy device in the stage when the nonces are 
required. This opens up the entire bandwidth of skimming and snooping attacks. 
After that, the same authors have provided an informal security analysis of EAC.103 EAC 
makes use of certificates for assuring integrity of the reader. The main criticism is the use of a 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the certificate management and the time management for 
deciding when a certificate is outdated and thus the corresponding reader not trustworthy 
anymore. The Entropy can be understood as a quality measure for randomness. The more 
entropy a nonce generator provides the less is it predictable. PKI is a tree-shaped data 
structure where the root certificate must be trusted and consequently all certificates which are 
signed with the root certificate are trusted as well. Any trusted certificate can serve as a root 
certificate in a subtree. Thus, the path from the trusted root certificate to a certificate which is 
used for the reader authentication can be arbitrarily long. In order to verify the certificate, it is 
necessary to verify all certificates in the certification path to the trusted root certificate. Thus, 
the entire path must be available in the MRTD chip which raises two questions, (a) how will 
the MRTD get all required certificates, and (b) how much time is needed to verify the entire 
path? As to the first question, there is a simple solution in EAC, that is they have to be 
transmitted. This, allows indeed to transmit arbitrary certificates in order to perform a Denial 
of Service (DoS) attack. The solution of the second question can be used for an attack on the 
limited resources of the MRTD. If it takes too long to verify the path of certificates (perhaps 
because of limited computing power), it will not be tolerated by neither of the parties, the 
citizens and the border control officers. The problem with an accurate time management is 
closely related to the problems with the PKI. Due to the lack of an internal clock in MRTDs, 
the current time can only be estimated. This is a problem, since the less accurate the time is 
the worse can outdated certificates be identified and rejected. The time in MRTDs is 
estimated from timestamps of recently evaluated certificates. However, if the MRTD is rarely 
used, the internal time estimation of the MRTD would be ‘stepping behind’ the real time. 
Thus, actually outdated certificates can be accepted as long as the MRTD does not receive a 
certificate with an up-to-date timestamp. 
5.3.3 German electronic identity card 
The German electronic identity card will be issued starting from 2010. Like the electronic 
passport, the identity card will contain a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chip with 
                                                 
102 Entropy can be understood as a quality measure for randomness. The more entropy a nonce 
generator provides the less is it predictable. 
103 Pasupathinathan et al. 2008b.  
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biometric data stored on it. Thus, the identity card will be capable of serving the same 
functionality as the electronic passport, unfortunately without any new security measures. 
This makes the identity card a fully featured MRTD, but the passport application is only one 
among others. The identity card will contain additional applications for eGovernment and 
eBusiness,104 which will be implemented by an additional authentication function and funct-
ionality for the qualified electronic signature.105 
The broadened application area of the identity card raises questions about the confidentiality 
of personal (and biometric) data stored on the MRTD.106 However, the blueprint of the 
identity card includes a clear separation between the applications. The biometric data which is 
stored on the chip will only be available to the passport application, and thus just for the 
purpose of borderline control. The other applications will have access on the name, address, 
and validity of the MRTD.107 
5.3.4 Protocols beyond BAC and EAC 
In parallel to their formal analysis of the security protocols of MRTDs, Pasupathinathan et al. 
propose a replacement for EAC, the On-Line Secure E-Passport Protocol (OSEP).108 With 
OSEP, the authors particularly tackle the questions of (a) confidentiality, (b) the freshness and 
authenticity for messages, and (c) possibly exploding computation complexity induced by 
certificate verification. In addition, OSEP uses a similar PKI structure as proposed in the 
ICAO standards. Thus, the authors argue, it would be easy to adopt OSEP into already 
implemented MRTD infrastructures. Instead of verifying large trust paths in the PKI, 
however, OSEP uses flat hierarchies in order to avoid DoS attacks. The back side of this 
protocol is the requirement to be online for authentication. This allows new attacks over 
limited network resources, but the overall evaluation is positive over currently applied 
protocols such as EAC. 
5.3.5 Conclusion 
The German passport remains, due to weak security, a privacy-invasive technology. The 
lacking security, particularly with respect to confidentiality, leads to the thread of unwittingly 
giving away personal data about biometric features. Recent works verify in a formal manner 
that security leaks exist in BAC and even in EAC. Most of these leaks are known since years 
and have been demonstrated in experiments. The communication protocols, however, only 
protect the communication between MRTD and reader. It is likely that new weaknesses 
appear in the data handling implementation of MRTD. Particularly, the implementation of an 
appropriate source of time is still subject of research. In addition, the current specification of 
EAC requires the MRTD to write data to persistent internal memory.109 This and the resource 
limitation of MRTDs leads to the well-known question, namely how to balance optimized 
memory management and secure functionality. 
In the case of the upcoming German electronic identity card, we observe that additional 
                                                 
104 Bundesministerium des Inneren 2008; Reisen 2008.  
105 Bender et al. 2008.  
106 Roßnagel et al. 2008.  
107 Kindt & Müller 2007.  
108 Pasupathinathan et al. 2008b. 
109 Pasupathinathan et al. 2008a.  
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services have been incorporated in order to provide one device for several application areas. 
This seems to contradict the recommendations of the FIDIS Budapest declaration. However, 
according to the specification,110 these new services have no access to the biometrics stored 
on the MRTD for the passport application and the user interface of the new applications 
differs in several ways from the passport application. The main difference is probably that the 
user is required to activate the new functionality with a PIN. Thus, it will be transparent to the 
user when it is not the passport application she is going to use. 
                                                 
110 Bundesministerium des Inneren 2008; Reisen 2008. 
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6 Political decisions  
6.1 Biometrics, the New Passport Act and a Dutch Central 
Database 
Since 2006, all Dutch passports are issued as a biometric passport with an RFID chip 
embedded for storing the face scan. Two finger scans will be added from the end of 
September 2009 onwards. In addition, an amendment111 to the Passport Act enables the 
storage of four finger scans in a central data base, the Municipal Vital Records (Gemeentelijke 
Basisadministratie), on top of two finger scans on the chip in the passport itself. The storage 
of the biometric fingerprint data on a central database is not a requirement of the EU Directive 
but a decision that has been specifically left to the member states. The Dutch amendment to 
its Passport Act goes against the FIDIS D3.14 recommendations on the regulation of central 
storage of biometric data as well as for transparency of biometric systems.112 On 20 January 
2009, the Dutch Parliament (Second Chamber) passed the amendment with a majority formed 
by the parties PvdA, VVD, ChristenUnie, SGP, CDA, PVV and the independent MP 
Verdonk. The Senate Commission for Home Affairs (BZK/AZ) published a report on 24 
March 2009,113 which received a ministerial reply on 28 April 2009.114 The Senate (First 
Chamber) then passed the new Passport Act in June 2009. In this Chapter, we will examine 
the arguments for and against the central storage of biometrics as discussed in the 
parliamentary debates.  
In the debate, several objections were raised by parliamentary representatives against central 
storage. Relevant arguments were, amongst others, that the new law created the possibility of 
function creep re citizens’ biometric data and that the new law would mean a significant 
departure from the basic principles of Dutch criminal law. The Minister offered several 
counterarguments that were subsequently accepted by a majority of the house.  
Firstly, the Minister pointed out that provision of data for criminal purposes from a central 
online consultative travel document administration does not differ from the present situation. 
The provision of data for the same purposes already occurs from the decentralized 
administrations. The only difference is the possibility to provide fingerprint data, this will 
now be introduced but is, however subject to strict conditions. 
Secondly, referring to the European Court of Human Rights decision in S. and Marper v 
UK,115 the registration system at issue in that judgment was compared to the travel document 
administration at issue. They are considered as being different based on the following two 
reasons. First, other than in the UK case, the central administration cannot be characterized as 
a criminal tracking register. The fingerprint registration applies to anyone who requests a 
travel document, and not merely to criminal suspects. Hence, there is no stigmatizing effect. 
Second, other than in the UK case, concerning the central administration, an assessment has 
been made between the private and public interest. This assessment led to the conclusion that 
                                                 
111 EK [Dutch First Chamber] 31 324 (R1844).  
112 See Müller & Kindt 2009.  
113 http://www.eerstekamer.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vi3muuvdnnsz/f=y.pdf.  
114 EK [Dutch First Chamber] 31324, Memorie van Antwoord, 28 April 2009. 
115 ECtHR 4 December 2008, S. and Marper v United Kingdom, Nos 30562/04 and 30566/04.  
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an accurate and effective travel document administration justifies the registration of 
fingerprints.116 Based on these arguments, the Dutch government holds that the S. and Marper 
judgment, has no consequences for the central online consultative travel document 
administration. 
The Dutch government’s preference for a central online consultative travel document 
administration derives from the necessity to make the request and distribution process more 
reliable.117 Apart from overriding security objectives (the prevention of identity fraud), the 
central register also provides a better service to the citizen. The request for a travel document 
should be made independently from the location where the travel document is requested.  
The Minister also specifically mentioned the following arguments in favor of the choice for a 
central administration for the biometric data.  
Firstly, a decentralized process would in any case require central components. This includes a 
central relegation index (Centrale verwijsindex). This index checks any prior requests for 
travel documents. It has to contain a substantial amount of data, which is also present in the 
decentralized administrations. 
Further, all decentralized administrations have to be equipped with software which verifies 
whether requests are made based on different identities (biometric search function). Every 
request made has to be sent to every decentralized administration (there are about 15,000 
requests per day). Even with a decentralized process, a central specialized research facility is 
necessary to examine the results of this search. 
With a decentralized process, the availability of the administrations is more vulnerable than 
with a central process. In a decentralized process, about 700 administrations and the central 
relegation index have to be available, bearing the risk of one administration being offline 
(holding up the process), and this inevitably costs more time than one central process. Also, 
every decentralized administration is vulnerable to peak loads. In a central process, this can be 
arranged more efficiently. 
In case of maintenance or adaptations, these would have to be done on 700 administrations 
simultaneously if these are decentralized. 
Lastly, a central process can provide better security. A decentralized process would require a 
higher level of security than the present level. It does not provide less security risks than a 
central process, because the integrity of all administrations would be at stake. 
Besides the issue of creating a central database for the biometric data, the access of criminal 
investigation agencies to the data stored in the database was a concern of some members of 
parliament. Article 4b(4) of the new Passport Act provides that the Public Prosecutor can 
request access to the data in the central register, under the strict rules applying to access to 
data in the context of a criminal investigation. The answer of the minister was brief, stating 
that provision of data for criminal purposes from a central online consultative travel document 
administration does not differ from the present situation.  
This is an interesting statement in view of another ministerial answer about finger scans of 
                                                 
116 This is thoroughly dealt with in the explanatory memorandum of the Bill. 
117 EK [Dutch First Chamber] 31324, Memorie van Antwoord, 28 April 2009.  
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foreigners (including other EU citizens).118 In contrast to the finger scans of non-foreign 
inhabitants of the Netherlands, all foreigner; fingers cans are already stored on the foreigner 
databank, for the purpose of identification. The finger scans are stored to prevent identity 
fraud and to make the implementation of the Foreigners Act 2000 run more efficiently.  
The finger scans are not stored for law enforcement purposes. Therefore, the Commission 
Meijers has suggested that after the Huber judgment,119 the European Court of Justice may 
find a swipe search of the foreigner bank on the basis of Article 55c Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering)120 unlawful.121 In a reply to questions from the 
Dutch Senate,122 the Minister of Justice has indicated that he does not think this is the case. 
He refers to the fact that in the proposal for the amendment to the Passport Act, Article 4a(1) 
stipulates that a face scan and four finger scans of every Dutch citizen are stored at the 
moment that she applies for a passport. As a result of Article 4b(4) of that same Passport Act, 
the Public Prosecutor can request access to these data. According to the Minister, the 
conditions applying to a Dutch passport holder suspect are similar in law to the situation 
where the suspect ‘is a foreigner in all likelihood’ and a search request is made by the 
prosecutor to have access to data in the foreigner databank.123 An interesting legal point here 
is whether the Minister in fact implies that swipe searches can be held in both databases to 
compare the finger scans of a suspect held against all scans in the data base.  
6.2 Analysis and conclusion 
In the implementation of European Regulation 2252/2004,124 which requires biometrics to be 
included in passports and travel documents, Dutch government has adapted the Passport Act 
not only to include two fingerprint and one face scan in travel documents, but also to create a 
central databank for storing these biometric data. In the political decision-making process, 
various arguments were advanced in favor of central storage, mostly relating to efficiency but 
also to law and order (anti-terrorism, combating illegal immigration, and crime-fighting). A 
key feature in this process was the desire to make application for travel documents 
independent from location, so that citizens can request a passport not only at the municipality 
where they reside, but also at other places. This convenience-enhancing requirement has 
implications for many of the arguments for central storage, since checking applications from 
different locations is much more difficult if the biometric data were stored in a decentralized 
way. As such, the convenience, service-delivery argument led quite easily to the decision to 
store the biometric data in a central databank.  
                                                 
118 See Article 1(e) and (m) of the Dutch Foreigners Act. 
119 Official Journal C 44 21.2.2009.  
120 This refers to a procedure which allows the state prosecutor access to data held by other authorities 
under certain circumstances. 
121 Commissie Meijers, Letter about Wetsvoorstel Identiteitsvaststelling verdachten, 22 January 2009, 
http://www.commissie-meijers.nl/assets/commissiemeijers/Commentaren/2009/CM0901 
%20Brief%20Commissie%20Meijers%20Wetsvoorstel%20Identiteitsvaststelling%20verdachten.pdf.  
122 EK [Dutch First Chamber] 31436, C, 17 March 2009, http://www.dnasporen.nl/docs/ 
wetregelgeving/KST128925.pdf.  
123 Ibid.  
124 Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features 
and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States, Official Journal L385, 
29/12/2004, p. 1-6.  
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The fact that central storage also has considerable implications for privacy of citizens, not the 
least through security risks posed by large-scale central databases, was much less discussed in 
the political and public debate. Only after the Passport Act had been passed by the First 
Chamber did some minor discussions take place in the media on the privacy implications of 
central storage of the fingerprints.  
It can only be guessed why exactly the privacy risks of central storage of biometric data in a 
databank mandated by the government were not a key issue in the political and public 
debates. Experience of the past decade shows that in the decisions by the Dutch legislator, 
privacy is often undervalued; arguments of security, but also efficiency and convenience, 
often prevail in the decision-making process.125 Warnings by security experts of the risks of 
large-scale central databases126 hardly penetrate into parliamentary debates. Even official 
reports criticizing the usefulness of creating huge national-intelligence databases for data 
mining purposes127 are largely unheeded by the administration and parliamentarians.  
In summary, the 2009 Dutch choice for a central databank with face and finger scans is 
supported by a large majority in the Dutch parliament. The possible PET alternative 
(biometric data on the passport only) has been rejected on efficiency and convenience 
grounds.  
The case of a central databank for travel-document biometric data confirms the trend of 
undervaluing of privacy in political decisions. In the present political climate that values 
security and efficiency so much, biometrics are therefore much more likely to be shaped as a 
privacy-invasive technology than as a privacy-enhancing technology.  

                                                 
125 See e.g. Vedder et al. 2007.  
126 See e.g. Jacobs 2007. 
127 Adviescommissie Informatiestromen Veiligheid 2007. 

Future of Identity in the Information Society (No. 507512) 
D3.16 
 





This deliverable has aimed to build on research in biometrics and PETs, in order to study the 
precise ‘PET content’ of biometric applications currently in use or under development. PET in 
this context refers to a technology that protects personal privacy by minimizing or eliminating 
the collection and/or handling of identifiable biometric data. PETs can be used as a flexible 
instrument in the hands of a person making use of a system, providing this individual with 
personal and self-determined control over their sensitive information. The most far-reaching 
form of privacy-enhancing biometrics is the system-on-card construction, where biometrics 
are encapsulated in a personal device and do not leave this device. The second most privacy-
enhancing measure is the match-on-card construction, where the data do not leave the card 
either but where the sensor reading the data is external, and therefore located outside the 
personal device or card. This means that the user still has to trust that the reader and the 
system do not store any templates.  
However, biometrics can also be created in a more privacy-invasive way. We have used the 
term ‘privacy-invasive technology’ PIT for these, referring to a technology that invades 
personal privacy by maximizing or creating the collection and/or handling of identifiable 
biometric data. An obvious example would be the storage of information in a manner where 
medical or racial information can be inferred; storing the raw template is privacy invading. 
This currently only occurs in basic biometric systems that are generally becoming outdated.128 
Equally intrusive however is the use of individuals’ biometric data to link their pseudonymity 
or identity between different applications, domains, and databases. Unnecessary privacy 
intrusion occurs when a biometric system is used for identification, where verification would 
already have met the objectives of the application. Finally, the use of biometrics for 
surveillance purposes seems inherently privacy invasive, since data subjects have no control, 
and sometimes also no knowledge, over biometric data being processed.  
Several types of decisions in the development process of biometrics applications influence 
their becoming PETs or PITs. These decisions are taken in the context of a complex process 
of balancing the interests of individuals to have control over their personal data and a series of 
other interests such as economic interests, policy and societal interests, security, but also 
convenience and efficiency interests. All these interests have a bearing on the use of 
biometrics and its relationship with data protection. 
This report has identified a series of possible criteria that can help to determine whether 
maximization of privacy has been a major factor in decisions on the design and use of 
biometric applications. These criteria are: obligatory or voluntary nature of the application, 
choice of biometric, authentication or verification function, multi-factor system use, personal 
control, access to biometric data, room for function creep, data quality, and interoperability, 
linkability and profiling.  
With these criteria in mind, a number of case studies have been made of processes of 
                                                 
128 An exception are forensic DNA databases. Many countries retain body samples, so that they can 
update or extend the biometric template (the DNA profile) in light of technical or legal developments, 
for example, comparing databases across countries that use different markers in the profile or to 
include new markers that can be more easily determined in deteriorated crime-scene material.  
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decision-making regarding various large-scale as well as small-scale biometrics applications. 
These case studies concern technical decisions made in biometric pseudonyms and iris 
recognition, using cryptographic techniques for privacy enhancement; technical and 
organizational decisions made if a Privacy Impact Assessment is conducted in the 
development of a biometric application; decisions taken during the test stage of voice-
recognition and the German ePass applications; and, finally, political decisions made about 
central storage of biometrics outside travel documents.  
Together, these case studies show a differentiated picture of biometrics as PETs or PITs. On 
the one hand, new applications are developed and commercialized that are relatively privacy-
enhanced, as the case study on biometric pseudonyms and iris recognition shows. On the 
other hand, the voice-recognition case studies show that, in  private-sector situations, costs 
can become a factor that prevents roll-out of a privacy-friendly biometric system. In the 
public sector, the two e-passport case studies show that despite the technical possibilities, 
many biometric applications are turned into PITs. For example, in the case study of the Dutch 
passport, the storage of biometrics on the passport itself could be argued to be relatively PET, 
because the passport owner keeps some control over who can read and use the biometric 
information on the passport. However, the decision to store the biometric information in a 
centralized database as well turns this application of biometrics definitely into a PIT, as it 
removes the notion of individual control over the data. The creation of a central database and 
the access such a database may provide to law enforcement and other government agencies is 
a principal demarkation point in any decision to use biometrics. The existence of a database 
provides possibilities for the (current or future) use of biometrics for surveillance purposes, 
and thus constitutes a major factor in the resulting application turning out a PET or a PIT.  
We thus observe that drivers behind PITs are political, often surveillance-related, interests, 
higher costs associated with privacy-enhanced applications, and perhaps also the commercial 
potential of information collection in a privacy-invasive application. Although these are major 
criteria in some contexts, they are by no means decisive reasons in many everyday contexts 
where biometrics are employed.  
One of the questions raised by our research is therefore, why, despite the technical 
possibilities – such as biometric pseudonyms – so few biometric applications are used as 
PETs. Technical, organizational, policy, and political decisions turn out to have a major 
influence on biometrics often becoming PITs. One explanation is that in the information 
economy as well as in today’s socio-political climate, the information-yielding potential of 
PIT applications seems to offer so many economic or political advantages that privacy 
arguments and PET alternatives pale in significance. However, another explanation is that 
there may be a lack of technical knowledge of privacy-preserving technologies at the stage 
where functional requirements for biometrics applications are specified, resulting in the 
creation of unnecessarily privacy-invasive biometrics.  
The possible gap identified in this report between expectations and assessments based on 
technical knowledge and between economic and political expectations of and requirements 
for biometric applications is very relevant for the development of the information society, in 
which biometrics is playing an increasingly vital role in identity management. It is 
recommended that further research, encompassing more and different types of case studies, is 
conducted to refine the tentative finding of the PET/PIT gap between technically-informed 
and commercial or politically-based decisions.  
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In the meantime, it seems important that both public and private policy-makers become more 
acquainted with recent technical advances in the field of privacy-enhanced biometrics. An 
adequate assessment, such as in a Privacy Impact Assessment, of the long-term effect of the 
use of biometrics on privacy can only be made when decision-makers have realistic expect-
ations based on solid knowledge of functional performance operations. The privacy implic-
ations of the use of biometric technology do not only have to be assessed on their own merits, 
but also in comparison with alternative identification, authentication, and verification sys-
tems, including the current situation.129  
Also, technical, organizational, and policy decisions should be more integrated. An important 
notion here is ‘value-sensitive design’:130 moral values and legal norms should be incorp-
orated in the design process of new technologies and applications at an early stage, which is a 
more effective and efficient way of ensuring that the resulting technologies and applications 
meet the normative societal context in which they are to function.131 Thus, the development of 
biometric applications should take place according to the notion of value-sensitive design. 
In conclusion, enhancing awareness of the technical possibilities of PETs and applying the 
notion of value-sensitive design can lead to better informed and more balanced choices in the 
development of biometric applications. This could reverse the worrying trend that is 
tentatively found in this report that the various types of decisions lead to biometrics often 





                                                 
129 Introna & Nissenbaum 2009, p. 47.  
130 Friedman 1998.  
131 See also Introna & Nissenbaum 2009, who recommend in relation to facial-recognition systems that 
‘moral and political considerations be seen as on a par with functional performance considerations, 
influencing the design of technology and installation as well as operational policies throughout the 
process of development and deployment and not merely tacked on at the end’ (p. 47).  
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